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ABSTRACT 
When people imagine a conviction occurring in the criminal justice system, they typically 
imagine a group of twelve jurors voting to convict a criminal defendant based on evidence that 
has been presented to them. However, the vast majority of criminal cases are resolved through 
plea agreements between the prosecution and a defendant, rather than a jury trial. Despite this, 
relatively little research has been conducted examining decisions to plead guilty, and the criminal 
justice infrastructure surrounding guilty pleas. In this thesis I draw on cognitive psychology and 
the law to identify and examine ways in which injustices may be arising in the current system 
with a focus on wrongful convictions arising from pleas where innocent defendants plead guilty. 
First, I show that due to a developmentally earlier cognitive processing style adolescents may be 
pleading guilty to crimes they did not commit more than adults, through making decisions that 
do not accord with values relating to guilt and innocence. Second, I show that the structure of the 
current plea system can lead to cognitive biases in plea decisions that are likely to influence 
innocent defendants more than guilty defendants, leading to innocent defendants pleading guilty 
at increased rates under predictable conditions. Finally, I show that current law creates a system 
in which it is sometimes desirable for innocent defendants to plead guilty, even where there is a 
low chance of conviction at trial.  I draw on these three findings to make recommendations 
regarding the current plea system and relevant law.  
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INNOCENT UNTIL PERSUADED TO PLEAD GUILTY: USING COGNITIVE 
PSYCHOLOGY TO EXAMINE PLEA BARGAINING’S INNOCENCE PROBLEM 
Rebecca K. Helm 
 
Thesis Introduction 
 
When people imagine a conviction occurring in the criminal justice system, they typically 
imagine a group of twelve jurors voting to convict a criminal defendant based on evidence that 
has been presented to them. However, the vast majority of criminal cases are resolved through 
plea agreements between the prosecution and a defendant, rather than a jury trial. For example, 
in 2015, 97.1% of federal criminal cases were resolved via a plea agreement between the 
prosecutor and the defendant rather than through a jury trial (United States Sentencing 
Commission 2014 Sourcebook). In these cases, broadly speaking, the prosecutor will make a 
plea offer to a defense attorney who will then convey this to the defendant who must decide 
whether to accept the offer (Caldwell, 2011). If a defendant decides to accept the plea offer they 
plead guilty and provided the judge accepts the plea, they will then be found guilty of what they 
pled guilty to (Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 11).  In deciding whether to accept or 
reject the plea, judicial focus is largely on whether the plea was knowing and intelligent (see 
Brady v United States, 1970). This does not depend on the substantive terms of the plea bargain, 
and because a plea is only considered involuntary when it is the results of “force, threats, or 
promises” extraneous to the agreement itself, prosecutors have wide latitude in setting the terms 
of plea arrangements (Blume & Helm, 2014). In Brady v United States, the Court even held that 
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the thread of the death penalty could be used to induce a guilty plea, as long as the plea was 
knowing and intelligent (Brady v United States, 1970).  
 Traditionally, plea bargaining has been justified as a process involving an in court 
confession, whereby a defendant can admit to something that they have done in order to receive 
a reduced sentence (Garrett, 2016). However, research suggests that innocent, as well as guilty 
defendants, are pleading guilty (see, for e.g., Blume & Helm, 2014; Dervan, 2012; Hessick & 
Saujani, 2002). Some commentators have justified this as innocent defendants being able to 
exercise a choice between an uncertain more severe punishment and a certain sure punishment 
(Bowers, 2008). However, this is only an appropriate justification if innocent defendants are 
truly choosing to plead guilty in accordance with their preferences, based on the risks and 
rewards involved. Psychological theory can make important contributions to the debate in this 
area, by highlighting situations in which defendants may not be making decisions that are truly in 
accordance with their preferences. In this thesis I present three studies, each drawing on 
cognitive psychology and psychological theory and examining a different reason why innocent 
defendants might plead guilty, other than based on their true values and preferences.  
 In the first paper, “Too young to plead? Risk, rationality, and plea bargaining’s innocence 
problem in adolescents,” I present a study demonstrating that certain defendants, particularly 
adolescents, may be pleading guilty when they are innocent at increased rates due to a hyper-
rational reasoning process. This is a developmentally inferior cognitive decision-making process 
that is responsive to superficial changes in plea offers, but that does not reflect underlying values 
and preferences (such as not wanting to plead guilty when innocent). In this study I show that  
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adolescents actually care more about not wanting to plead guilty when they are innocent than 
adults do, but plead guilty more when asked to assume innocence rather than guilt and make 
decisions that do not reflect underlying values.  
 In the second paper, “Guilty or biased? When innocence, but not guilt, can lead to 
pleading guilty,” I show that mock innocent defendants are influenced to a greater extent than 
mock guilty defendants by a common cognitive bias, the anchoring heuristic. Results suggest 
that while guilty defendants appear to be making decisions based on weighing up risks and 
rewards, innocent defendants are influenced by more abstract concepts such as not wanting to 
plead guilty when innocent.  I show that this can lead to innocent defendants being more 
influenced by cognitive biases, and even pleading guilty more often than guilty defendants under 
certain predictable conditions.  
 In the final paper, “Limitations on the ability to negotiate justice: Attorney perspectives 
on plea bargaining’s innocence problem,” I interview attorneys to understand how the current 
system encourages innocent defendants to plead guilty, and how attorney advice may shape this 
practice. Results suggest that prosecutors are able to offer highly coercive deals which lead 
innocent defendants to plead guilty even when the risks of conviction are low, due to the fear of 
a harsh punishment. In addition, results show that attorneys may be reluctant to encourage 
defendants to go to trial due to a fear of imposing serious risks on a client, despite also 
encouraging innocent defendants to go to trial more often even when controlling for the 
probability of conviction at trial.  
 Based upon these three studies, I conclude with suggestions to improve the plea 
bargaining system for innocent defendants. These include updating competence to stand trial 
standards, reducing the cases in which adolescents can plead guilty, improving transparency and 
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information sharing during the plea process, and promoting sentence rather than charge 
bargaining to reduce huge discrepancies between plea outcomes and outcomes if convicted at 
trial.   
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Too young to plead? Risk, rationality, and plea bargaining’s innocence problem in adolescents. 
 
Thesis Paper 1 
 
Rebecca K. Helm 
 
Cornell University, Department of Human Development 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
The overwhelming majority of both adult and juvenile convictions occur as the result of guilty 
pleas rather than trial.  This means that convictions are often the result of decisions made by 
defendants rather than jurors. It is therefore important to study decision-making in defendants to 
ensure convictions are occurring in a fair and principled way. Research suggests that the current 
plea bargaining system is leading innocent defendants to systematically plead guilty to crimes 
that they did not commit, and that this may be more widespread in juveniles than adults. The 
current study uses Fuzzy-Trace Theory to develop and test and explanation of why juveniles are 
more likely than adults to plead guilty to crimes they did not commit. We show that as predicted 
juveniles are more likely than adults to plead guilty when they are innocent, and that this is due 
to a developmental stage in decision-making whereby values are unlikely to be retrieved and 
applied when making decisions. This has implications for post-conviction claims of innocence 
by juveniles, procedural rules governing juvenile plea bargaining, and the practice of juvenile 
plea bargaining more generally.  
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Too young to plead? Risk, rationality, and plea bargaining’s innocence problem in adolescents. 
 
In the current criminal justice system, the overwhelming majority of cases involving both adult 
and juvenile defendants are resolved via plea bargaining rather than trial (Redlich & Shteynberg, 
2016). However, research has suggested that plea bargaining may be an important cause of 
wrongful convictions, as innocent defendants appear to be pleading guilty to crimes that they did 
not commit (Blume & Helm, 2014; Dervan, 2012; Dervan & Edkins, 2013; Helm & Reyna, 
2017; Redlich, 2009).  In fact, in 2017, about 18% of exonerations listed in the National Registry 
of Exonerations was categorized as involving a guilty plea (National Registry of Exonerations, 
2017). The true number of wrongful convictions from guilty pleas is likely higher since 
exoneration is extremely hard for defendants who have pled guilty (Blume & Helm, 2014).  
 Research suggests that this phenomena, known as plea bargaining’s innocence problem 
may be even more pronounced in adolescents than it is in adults. For example, a recent 
experimental study showed that juveniles were more than twice as likely as young adults to plead 
guilty when asked to assume innocence (Redlich & Shteynberg, 2016), and another study 
showed that a cognitive processing style associated with adolescence (verbatim based 
processing) may lead to an increased tendency to plead guilty when innocent (Helm & Reyna, 
2017).  In this paper, we use Fuzzy-Trace Theory (FTT), a psychological theory of memory and 
decision-making, to explain the mechanisms that may be leading adolescents to plead guilty to 
crimes they did not commit more than adults, and test this explanation using an experimental 
design.  
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Existing Research on Juvenile Plea-Bargaining 
 Traditionally, the American criminal justice system had adjudicated adolescent 
defendants within a juvenile justice system, separated from the adult justice system (Cauffman & 
Steinberg, 2012). Although this system was created to recognize the special needs and immature 
status of adolescents, starting in the 1980s society has increasingly opted to deal with adolescent 
offenders more punitively, either within the juvenile justice system, or by re-defining them as 
adults and trying them in adult criminal court (Cauffman & Steinberg, 2012). This is 
problematic, because extensive research shows that adolescents are likely to have manifest 
deficits in legally-relevant abilities due to developmental immaturity (Grisso et al., 2003; 
Steinberg & Scott, 2003). Important differences have been observed in the cognition of 
adolescents and adults (Reyna, Chapman, Dougherty, & Confrey, 2012). Differences between 
adolescents and adults also include less future orientation, worse risk perception, and more 
susceptibility to peer influence in adolescents when compared to adults (Grisso et al., 2003). 
Research has also shown important neurodevelopmental differences between adolescents and 
adults that may be responsible for developmentally immature decision-making (see, for e.g. 
Blakemore & Choudhury, 2006; Casey, Jones, & Hare, 2008). For example, one 
conceptualization of mechanisms underlying developmental behavior changes suggest an 
imbalance between the development of motivational systems in the brain (subcortical regions 
such as the ventral striatum) and control systems in the brain (prefrontal regions) (Casey, Jones, 
& Somerville, 2011). Although motivational systems and control systems are both developing, 
the motivational systems are posited to develop faster, leading to a period with developed 
motivation, but a lack of top-down control (Casey, Jones, & Somerville, 2011).  
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These developmental differences between adolescents and adults have been shown to 
result in important differences between the decision making of adolescents and adults in the 
adjudicative context. For example, research examining abilities relating to adjudicative 
competence using the MacArthur Competence Assessment Tool – Criminal Adjudication (Hoge, 
Bonnie, Poythress, & Monahan, 1999) has shown that adolescents tend to possess less legal 
knowledge and understanding than adults (Grisso et al., 2003). Importantly, research also 
suggests that the willingness to falsely take responsibility for an act decreases with age (Redlich 
& Goodman, 2003).   
Research has also directly examined the role of developmental differences when making 
plea decisions. It has been shown that adolescents are more likely than young adults to make 
choices that reflect compliance with authority (Grisso, et. al., 2003) and that are overly 
influenced by short-term benefits (Daftary-Kapur & Zottoli, 2014). Research also suggests that 
adolescents are often not fully aware of their legal options, and have limited understanding of the 
plea bargaining process (Daftary-Kapur & Zottoli, 2014). Importantly, research suggests that 
adolescents may be more likely than adults to plead guilty to crimes they did not commit 
(Redlich & Shtyenberg, 2016). In their 2016 study, Redlich and Shtyenberg gave hypothetical 
plea vignettes involving a robbery in a jewelry store to adolescents (aged 13-17) and young 
adults (aged 18-24). Half of the participants were asked to assume guilt, and the other half were 
asked to assume innocence. Results showed that when asked to assume guilt there was no 
significant difference between adolescent and young adult plea decisions, but when asked to 
assume innocence, adolescents were 2.47 times more likely to plead guilty than adults (Redlich 
& Shtyenberg, 2016). Notably, interviews with youth and adults who have made real plea 
decisions also tends to support this result. In interviews with youth and adults who pled guilty, 
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one study found that more than a quarter of adolescents (26.5%) compared to just under a fifth of 
adults (19%) claimed to be completely innocent (Zottoli, Daftary-Kapur, Winters, & Hogan, 
2016).  
Another recent study focused on the influence of cognitive processing type on plea 
decisions (Helm & Reyna, 2017). This study found (using an adult sample) that cognitive 
processing typically associated with adolescents led to being less influenced by guilt or 
innocence when making plea decisions. Importantly, results suggested that this was due to 
appropriate values not being retrieved during the plea process, rather than due to the extent to 
which guilt and innocence were considered important (Helm & Reyna, 2017). This implies that 
adolescents cognitive processing is likely to similarly lead them to be less influenced by guilt or 
innocence when making plea decisions due to not retrieving appropriate values.  
Fuzzy-Trace Theory and Cognitive Processing in Adolescents 
FTT is a dual process theory of memory and decision-making (Reyna, 2012). According to FTT, 
when an individual learns information they will encode both the verbatim details of that 
information, and the gist (or meaning) of that information in context (Reyna & Kiernan, 1994; 
1995). The verbatim representation of the information is literal and precise, whereas the gist 
representation of the information is fuzzy and meaning-based (Reyna, 2012). For example, if a 
person is told that there is a 10% chance of rain when deciding to go bungee jumping they will 
encode this figure (10%) and also the gist of this figure (a low chance). If a person if told there is 
a 10% chance of death when deciding to go bungee jumping they will also encode this figure 
(10%) and the gist of this figure (a high chance) (Helm, Hans, & Reyna, in press). Thus, the 
same verbatim information can have different gists depending on meaning and context.  
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 When a person uses information to make a decision, they can rely on either verbatim-
based processing (utilizing verbatim-based representations of information) or gist-based 
processing (utilizing gist-based representations of information) (Reyna, 2012). Verbatim-based 
processing is precise and detailed, whereas gist-based processing is more fuzzy and 
impressionistic (e.g. Reyna & Brainerd, 1992). Gist-based processing is associated with a 
healthier attitude to risk-taking. This is because verbatim-based processing can result in precise 
and superficial trade-offs of risk and reward (e.g. 10% chance of death that can be outweighed by 
benefits of fun activity), whereas gist-based processing focuses on meaning and thus recognizes 
that even large rewards cannot compensate for certain risks (e.g. the risk of death). This has been 
supported by research examining risk-taking (Reyna et al, 2011, Reyna & Mills, 2014).  
 Individuals relying on verbatim-based processing are less likely to access their values 
(meaning what is important to them) and decide in accordance with them when making decisions 
(Fujita & Han, 2009, see also Helm & Reyna, 2017). This is because long term representations of 
values are stored in a gist-based form, as they are meaning-based rather than precise (Fukukura, 
Ferguson & Fujita, 2013) and also because verbatim-representations fade more quickly over time 
(Reyna & Kiernan, 1994; 1995), and are too specific to be applicable to a wide variety of 
decisions (Helm & Reyna, 2017). When people rely on gist-based processing they are more 
likely to cue these values, due to the similarity between the representations of information 
involved in the decision and the representations of values, a well-known property of retrieval 
cueing (see Helm & Reyna, 2017).  
   According to FTT, gist-based processing is developmentally advanced, and develops 
with age and experience (Reyna & Ellis, 1994; Reyna et al, 2011). Thus, adolescents are 
predicted to rely on verbatim-based processing to a greater extent than adults. This prediction has 
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been confirmed by experimental research (Reyna & Farley, 2006, Reyna et al, 2011, Reyna, 
Wilhelms, McCormick, & Weldon, 2015).  
The Influence of Verbatim-Based Processing on Plea Bargaining in Adolescents 
 Verbatim-based processing is precise and influenced by superficial details, meaning that 
individuals relying on verbatim-based processing are more likely than individuals relying on 
gist-based processing to be influenced by superficial details such as the difference between one 
year of probation and two years of probation, and less likely to be influenced by meaning-based 
concepts such as factual guilt or innocence. Previous research has shown that, as predicted, 
individuals thought to be relying more on verbatim-based processing are less likely to be 
influenced by factual guilt or innocence (Helm & Reyna, 2017). 
 Because reliance on gist-based processing develops with age and experience, we expect 
adolescents to rely more on verbatim-based processing than adults, and young adults to rely 
more on verbatim-based processing than older adults. We therefore expect adolescents in 
particular to be more influenced by superficial distinctions (such as the distinction between one 
year of probation and two years of probation) and less influenced by meaning-based concepts, 
most importantly for this study factual guilt or innocence. This trend should shift during young 
adulthood, and post-college-aged adults would be expected to be more influenced by meaning-
based concepts such as guilt or innocence, and less influenced by superficial distinctions.  
 This important difference in plea decisions is predicted to occur independently of changes 
in values (e.g. it does not occur because sentence-length becomes less important with age or 
because guilt or innocence becomes more important with age). Rather, it occurs because 
decisions in younger individuals are based on precise superficial details and do not reflect 
underlying values, and what is important to an individual. This means adolescents are likely to 
	   13	  
be systematically making plea decisions that do not reflect what is important to them, due purely 
to their cognitive processing style. Thus, the shift from verbatim-based processing to gist-based 
processing can explain findings suggesting that adolescents are more likely to plead guilty to 
crimes that they did not commit.  
 This leads to three primary predictions, that will be tested in the current study: 
1) The influence of superficial distinctions (such as the distinction between one and two 
years of probation) is likely to decrease with age, and influence adolescents to a greater 
extent than adults.  
2) The influence of guilt or innocence is likely to increase with age, and influence adults to 
a greater extent than adolescents.  
3) The importance of guilt or innocence to individuals will not change with age, but values 
related to guilt or innocence will be more easily accessed as individuals begin to rely on 
gist-based processing, and so will be reflected in decisions more as age increases.  
 
 
Method 
 
Participants 
 Participants were 149 adolescents recruited from across the country, 200 college-aged 
adults recruited from the participant pool at Cornell University, and 187 post-college-aged adults 
recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk. Participants completed the study online and 
participation took around 15 minutes. Adolescent participants ranged in age from 9 – 17 (M = 
13.93, SD = 2.39), college-aged adult participants ranged in age from 18 – 22 (M = 19.62, SD = 
1.13), post-college-aged adult participants ranged in age from 23 – 60 (M = 38.74, SD = 10.17). 
36.2% of our adolescent sample were male, compared to 17.6% of our young adult sample, and 
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49.2% of our older adult sample. All participants provided consent to take part in the study, and 
the project was approved by the Cornell Institutional Review Board.  
Materials and Procedure 
 The plea-decision task. Our plea decision task replicated a task used in Helm & Reyna, 
2017. Participants were each given four hypothetical plea vignettes and were asked to imagine 
that they had been arrested and accused of a particular crime. They were given introductory 
information to enable them to understand the relevant law, procedure, and outcomes, and were 
given an estimate of the probability that they would be convicted at trial. The four vignettes 
varied in terms of the type of case involved (theft or arson) and the probability of conviction at 
trial (30% or 70%). Each participant saw one vignette involving a theft case with a 30% chance 
of conviction at trial, one vignette involving a theft case with a 70% chance of conviction at trial, 
one vignette involving an arson case with a 30% chance of conviction at trial, and one vignette 
involving an arson case with a 70% conviction at trial.   
 Other details of the plea vignettes (whether the participant was told they were guilty or 
not guilty, whether there was a sentence length incentive to plead guilty, and whether there was a 
conviction charge incentive to plead guilty) were manipulated between-subjects. Participants 
were randomly assigned to a guilt condition (they were told that they were guilty or not guilty in 
all of the problems they saw), a sentence-length incentive condition (either a 1-year probation 
sentence was offered for the plea compared to a 2-year probation sentence if convicted at trial, or 
both plea and conviction at trial would result in a 1-year probation sentence), and a conviction-
charge incentive condition (either a misdemeanor was offered for the plea compared to a felony 
if convicted at trial, or both plea and conviction at trial would result in a felony).  
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 Thus, the experiment had two within-subject’s factors each with two levels – probability 
of conviction at trial (30% or 70%) and case type (theft or arson) and three between-subjects 
factors – Guilt, Sentence-Length Incentive, and Conviction-Charge Incentive.  
 Questions about values. Participants were then asked about the extent to which the 
following values were important to them when making plea decisions – not pleading guilty to a 
crime I did not commit, not wanting to risk getting a felony conviction, the fact a felony 
conviction is worse than a misdemeanor conviction, how high the probability of getting 
convicted at trial was, how long potential sentences were, and the difference in sentence length 
of the plea compared to the potential outcome of a trial. Participants rated the importance of each 
of these values on a scale from 1 (not at all important) to 7 (extremely important).  
 MacArthur Questions. Participants in our adolescent sample also answered questions 
taken from the MacArthur Competence Tool for Criminal Adjudication (MacCat-CA) (Hoge, et 
al., 1999). This was to ensure that they understood the nature of the trial process and plea 
bargaining. Specifically, participants answered questions about the roles of the defense attorney, 
the prosecutor, and the jury, and about what a defendant has to admit if they plead guilty, and 
what the results of a guilty plea would be.  
 
Results 
 
Responses to McArthur questions demonstrated that adolescents did have sufficient 
understanding of trial and plea procedures to be considered competent by current standards. We 
therefore did not exclude any participants in our analyses. 
Developmental Differences in Values 
 
 First, we investigated potential developmental differences in values relating to plea-
bargaining by using one-way analyses of variance comparing value ratings across our three 
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groups – adolescents, college-aged adults, and post-college-aged adults. We found that our 
groups differed in the extent to which they considered not pleading guilty to a crime they did not 
commit important (F(2,540)=6.60, p=.001, ηp2 = .024) (Figure 1).  Follow-up pairwise 
comparisons show that our college-aged sample and our post-college-aged sample found the 
principle to be significantly less important than our adolescent sample (p=.048, d =.238, and p < 
.001, d = .390, respectively). Our groups also differed in the extent to which they considered the 
probability of conviction at trial to be important. (F(2,540)=5.03, p=.007, ηp2 = .018) (Figure 2). 
Follow-up pairwise comparisons show that our post-college-aged adult sample found the 
principle to be significantly less important than our adolescent sample (p =.003, d = .318) and 
our college-aged adult sample (p = .022, d = .228).  
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Figure 1: Importance 
of “I would not plead           
guilty to a crime I did 
not commit” 1 (not at 
all) -7 (extremely), 
split by age group. 
*p<.05. Error bars 
represent +/ - 1 one 
standard error.     
               
    
	  
Figure 2: Importance 
of probability of 
conviction at trial 
1 (not at all) -7 
(extremely), split by 
age group. *p<.05. 
Error bars represent 
+/ - 1 one standard 
error.     
               
    
* 
* 
* 
* 
	   17	  
Participants importance ratings of our other values did not differ significantly.  
 
Developmental Differences in Plea Decisions 
 We conducted a repeated-measures ANOVA in which the dependent variable was plea 
decisions in order to test our predictions regarding cognitive processing styles in adolescents, 
young adults, and older adults. We collapsed across case (although note that all significant 
effects remain when controlling for case), meaning the dependent variable was mean plea 
decisions across the theft case and the arson case. Plea decisions were scored as 0 (decided to go 
to trial) and 1 (decided to plead guilty), giving a dependent variable ranging from 0 (accepted 
plea decisions in both cases) to 1 (decided to plead guilty in both cases).  
 Factors in the ANOVA were probability of conviction at trial (30% or 70%) (within-
subjects), guilty or not guilty (between-subjects), sentence-length incentive to plead guilty 
(whether the outcome from pleading guilty was a 1-year probation sentence compared to a 2-year 
probation sentence if convicted at trial, or whether pleading guilty and conviction at trial would 
both result in a 2-year probation sentence), and conviction-charge incentive to plead guilty 
(whether the outcome from pleading guilty was a misdemeanor compared to a felony if 
convicted at trial, or whether pleading guilty and conviction at trial would both result in a felony 
conviction), and population (adolescents, young adults, and older adults).   
Significant Results Involving Sentence Length. Results revealed a main-effect of 
sentence-length incentive, such that overall participants pled guilty more often when there was a 
sentence-length incentive to do so (i.e. when they would get one year of probation for pleading 
guilty but two years of probation if convicted at trial, compared to one year of probation either 
way) (Msentence-lengthincentive = .432, SE = .019, Mnosentence-lengthincentive = .33, SE = .018) 
(F(1,524)=15.06, p <.001, ηp2 
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sentence-length incentive and population, although this result just missed significance 
(F(2,524)=2.46, p=.086, ηp2 =.009) (Figure 3). Giving a superficial sentence length incentive 
significantly influenced adolescents (p = .002, ηp2 =.061) but did not significantly influence 
college-aged adults (p = .062, ηp2 =.017) or post-college-aged adults (p = .624, ηp2 =.001).  
 
 
Figure 3: Significant two-way interaction between sentence-length incentive and population 
when predicting plea decisions (p=.086). *p<.05. Error bars represent +/ - 1 one standard 
error. 
 
 
Significant Effects Involving Guilt. Results revealed a main-effect of guilt, such that 
overall participants pled guilty more often when they were guilty (Mguilty = .50 , SE = .019, 
Mnotguilty = .26, SE = .019) (F(1,524)=80.62, p <.001, ηp2 =.133). Results also revealed an 
interaction between guilt and population (F(2,524)=4.75, p =.009, ηp2 =.018) (Figure 4). While 
all populations were significantly influenced by guilt, this effect was largest in the older adult 
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sample (p<.001, ηp2 =.214), then the young adult sample (p<.001, ηp2 =.114), and smallest in the 
adolescents (p=.011, ηp2 =.042).  
 
	    
Figure 4: Significant two-way interaction between guilt and population when predicting plea 
decisions (p=.009). Error bars represent +/ - 1 one standard error. *p<.05. 
 
 
Follow-up pairwise comparisons examining innocent participants only showed that 
innocent adolescents and innocent college-aged adults pled guilty significantly more often than 
innocent post-college-aged adults (p=.003, and p = .013 respectively). There was no significant 
difference between adolescents and college-aged adults (p =.330). There were also no significant 
differences between groups when examining guilty participants. 
There was also a three-way interaction among guilt, population, and conviction-charge 
incentive (whether a participant could get a misdemeanor by pleading when the outcome if 
convicted at trial would be a felony, or whether the outcome would be a felony either way) 
(F(2,524)=4.46, p = .012, ηp2 = .017) (Figure 5).  
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Figure 5: Significant three-way interaction among conviction-charge incentive, population, and 
guilt when predicting plea decisions (p=.012). *p<.05. Error bars represent +/ - 1 one standard 
error. 
 
 When there was no conviction-charge incentive (so participants would get a 
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guilty more often than when they were not guilty. Here, there was no significant difference in the 
extent to which different populations were influenced by guilt (although we see a trend towards 
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get a felony if convicted at trial), adolescents were not significantly influenced by whether they 
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whether they were guilty or innocent, pleading guilty more when they were guilty (p <.001, ηp2 
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innocent, again pleading guilty more often when they were guilty (p <.001, ηp2 =.400). Follow-up 
pairwise comparisons examining innocent participants only showed that innocent adolescents 
and innocent college-aged adults pled guilty significantly more often than innocent post-college-
aged adults (p=.004, and p = .008 respectively). There was no significant difference between 
adolescents and college-aged adults (p =.690). Follow-up pairwise comparisons examining guilty 
participants only showed that guilty post-college-aged adults pled guilty significantly more often 
than guilty adolescents (p=.001). There were no significant differences between college-aged 
adults and adolescents (p = .131) or college-aged adults and post-college-aged adults (p = .068).  
 Other Significant Results. Results revealed a main-effect of conviction-charge incentive 
such that participants pled guilty more often when there was a charge incentive to do so (i.e. they 
could get a misdemeanor by pleading guilty whereas the outcome if convicted at trial would be a 
felony, as opposed to getting a felony either way) (Mconviction-chargeincentive = .468, SE = .019, 
Mnoconviction-chargeincentive = .294, SE = .018) (F(1,524)=43.50, p <.001, ηp2 =.077). There was also a 
main-effect of probability, such that participants pled guilty more often when there was a higher 
chance of conviction at trial (i.e. in our 70% chance of conviction at trial condition, compared to 
our 30% chance of conviction at trial condition) (M70% = .523, SE = .018, M30% = .239, SE = 
.015) (F(1,524)=198.57, p <.001, ηp2 =.275). 
 Results also revealed three significant two-way interactions. First, a two-way interaction 
between population and probability (F(2,524)=4.02, p=.019, ηp2 =.015) (Figure 6). There was a 
significant main-effect of probability in each population, but this effect was largest in our 
college-aged adult sample. There were no significant differences in decisions made by 
population when there was a 30% chance of conviction, or when there was a 70% chance of 
conviction.   
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Figure 6: Significant two-way interaction between probability of conviction and population 
when predicting plea decisions (p=.019). Error bars represent +/ - 1 one standard error. 
 
 
There was also a significant two-way interaction between probability (30% chance of 
conviction or 70% chance of conviction) and conviction-charge incentive (whether a participant 
could get a misdemeanor by pleading when the outcome if convicted at trial would be a felony, 
or whether the outcome would be a felony either way) (F(1,524)=19.82, p<.001, ηp2 =.036). 
Whether there was a conviction charge incentive made a significant difference regardless of the 
probability of conviction, such that participants were more likely to plead guilty when there was 
a conviction charge incentive to do so, but this difference was larger when there was a 70% 
chance of conviction (M70%nochargeincentive = .391, SE = .026, M70%chargeincentive = .655, SE = .025 , p 
<.001, ηp2 = .094; M30%nochargeincentive = .197, SE = ..022, M30%chargeincentive = .281, SE = .021 , p = 
.005 , ηp2 = .015).  
 Finally, there was a significant two-way interaction between sentence-length incentive 
(whether a participant could get one-year of probation when they would get two years if 
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convicted at trial, or whether they would get one-year of probation either way) and conviction-
charge incentive (whether a participant could get a misdemeanor by pleading when the outcome 
if convicted at trial would be a felony, or whether the outcome would be a felony either way) 
(F(1,524)= 4.52, p=.034, ηp2 = .009). When there was a conviction-charge incentive, a sentence-
length incentive did not make a significant difference (Msentence-lengthincentive = .491, SE =.027, 
Mnosentence-lengthincentive = .445, SE = .025, p =.198, ηp2 = .006). When there was not a conviction-
charge incentive, a sentence-length incentive did make a significant difference, such that more 
people pled guilty when they could get a shorter sentence for pleading guilty compared to the 
possible outcome at trial (Msentence-lengthincentive = .373, SE = .027, Mnosentence-lengthincentive = .215, SE = 
.027, p <.001, ηp2 = .061).  
Are Adolescent’s Values Reflected in Their Decisions? 
In order to examine why adolescents rated “I would not plead guilty to a crime I did not 
commit” as being more important to them than college-aged and post-college-aged adults did but 
were pleading guilty when innocent more often than post-college-aged adults, and equally often 
to college-aged adults, we conducted a regression, with plea decisions as outcome, and with 
population (adolescents, college-aged adults, post-college-aged adults), the importance of “I 
would not plead guilty to a crime I did not commit”, and the interaction between population and 
the importance of “I would not plead guilty to a crime I did not commit” as predictors.1 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 We also conducted this regression controlling for sentence-length distinction, and conviction-
charge distinction, and significant effects remained significant. We also conducted the regression 
examining decisions with a 70% chance of conviction at trial only and significant effects 
remained significant. Finally, we conducted the regression examining decisions with a 30% 
chance of conviction at trial only. In this regression, the interaction between “I would not plead 
guilty to a crime I did not commit” and population remained significant, but the main effect of 
population was no longer significant (p = .130).  
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 This regression revealed a significant main-effect of population, such that as the 
population became older, less participants who were told they were innocent accepted plea deals 
(B = -.193, SE = .077, β = -.517, t = -2.492, p = .013). Innocent adolescents accepted plea deals 
in 32.57% of cases (SD = .303), innocent college-aged adults accepted plea deals in 28.37% of 
cases (SD = .279), and innocent post-college-aged adults accepted plea deals in 18.48% of cases 
(SD = .277).  
The regression also revealed a significant interaction between population and the 
importance of “I would not plead guilty to a crime I did not commit” (B = .046, SE = .013, β = 
.784, t = 3.446, p = .001). In order to investigate this interaction, we examined the correlations 
between “I would not plead guilty to a crime I did not commit,” and plea decisions in each 
population separately (Figure 7).  
In the post-college aged adults, and in the college-aged adults, there was a negative 
correlation between the importance of “I would not plead guilty to a crime I did not commit” and 
plea decisions of innocent participants (rho(92) = -.478, p <.001, and rho(104) = -.439, p = 
<.001, respectively), such that the more important the principle was, the less participants would 
plead guilty when innocent. In adolescents there was no significant correlation between the 
importance of “I would not plead guilty to a crime I did not commit” and plea decisions of 
innocent participants (rho(72)=.004, p = .973).  
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Figure 7: Correlations between the importance of “I would not plead guilty to a crime I did not 
commit” and plea decisions of innocent participants, split by population.  
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Discussion 
 
FTT predicts that adolescents will be more likely to make plea decisions that are not 
influenced by meaning-based concepts such as guilt or innocence, but more likely to be 
influenced by superficial, surface-level details. Importantly, the lack of sensitivity to meaning-
based concepts, and guilt or innocence in particular, is predicted to be due to a failure to retrieve 
appropriate underlying values, rather than due to a difference in those values. In this study we 
tested the influence of several factors that were predicted to be important when making plea 
decisions. Specifically, we tested the influence of guilt or innocence (our meaning-based 
manipulation), the presence of a superficial difference in sentence length between plea and trial 
(our superficial manipulation), the probability of conviction at trial, and the presence of a 
conviction-charge distinction between plea and trial (facing a misdemeanor at plea compared to a 
felony if convicted at trial). We tested the influence of these factors across cases involving theft 
and cases involving arson. We predicted that the influence of our superficial distinction (getting 
one year of probation for pleading guilty when the outcome if convicted at trial would be two 
years of probation, as opposed to getting two years of probation either way) would decrease with 
age, and would influence adolescents to a greater extent than adults. We also predicted that the 
influence of our meaning-based distinction (guilt or innocence) would increase with age, and 
would influence adults to a greater extent than adolescents. Importantly, we predicted that this 
would not be due to a change in values with age but the fact that values relating to guilt or 
innocence would be more easily accessed as age increased due to increasing reliance on gist-
based processing. Results confirmed all of these predictions (although note that the result 
involving our superficial sentence-length distinction just missed significance).  
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The Influence of a Superficial Sentence Length Incentive on Plea Decisions 
Results show that as predicted the influence of superficial incentives on plea decisions 
decreased with age. Specifically, adolescents were significantly influenced by being offered one 
year of probation for pleading guilty when the possible outcome at trial was two years of 
probation as opposed to receiving two years of probation either way. Importantly, this result was 
not moderated by guilt, the presence of a conviction charge distinction (being offered a 
misdemeanor for pleading guilty when the outcome if convicted at trial would be a felony, 
compared to receiving a felony either way), or probability. This suggests that even not guilty 
adolescents, adolescents who will receive a felony for pleading guilty, and adolescents for whom 
the chance of conviction at trial is low, are influenced by a superficial sentence length incentive. 
Our college-aged adults and post-college aged adults were not significantly influenced by this 
incentive (although note that qualitatively the college-aged adults were influenced more than the 
post-college age adults, suggesting a developmental trend).  
The Influence of Guilt and Innocence on Plea Decisions 
 Our results show that adolescents, college-aged adults, and post-college-aged adults were 
all influenced by whether they were assumed to be guilty or innocent, pleading guilty more often 
when they were guilty. This result is consistent with previous findings in the literature showing 
that guilty defendants do plead guilty more often than not guilty defendants (Bordens, 1984; 
Gregory, Mowen, & Linder, 1978; Tor, Gazal-Ayal, & Garcia, 2010). As predicted, while all 
populations were significantly influenced by guilt, this effect was largest in the post-college-aged 
adult sample, then the college-aged adults sample, and smallest in the adolescent sample. 
Importantly, this resulted in adolescents and college-aged adults pleading guilty when they were 
innocent significantly more often than post-college aged adults.  This finding supports existing 
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experimental research (Redlich & Shtyenberg, 2016) and research examining real plea decisions 
(Zottoli, Daftary-Kapur, Winters, & Hogan, 2016).  
 Interestingly, this effect also interacted with the presence of a conviction charge incentive 
(being able to get a misdemeanor by pleading when the outcome if convicted at trial would be a 
felony, as opposed to the outcome being a felony either way). Adolescents were sensitive to the 
distinction between guilt and innocence when there was no conviction charge incentive to plead 
guilty, and there was no significant difference in the extent to which our groups were influenced 
by guilt or innocence (although there was a trend towards adolescents being less influenced by 
guilt or innocence). Our group differences were primarily driven by our conviction in which 
participants could get a misdemeanor by pleading guilty. In this condition, adolescents and 
college-aged adults pled guilty to crimes they did not commit significantly more often than post-
college-aged adults, and adolescents who were guilty pled guilty significantly less often than 
post-college-aged adults. This suggests that when there are fewer less abstract factors at play, age 
differences based on guilt or innocence are less pronounced.  
The finding that adolescents are least responsive to guilt or innocence is particularly 
interesting given our value ratings, which show that adolescents cared significantly more about 
not wanting to plead guilty to a crime that they did not commit than college-aged and post-
college-aged adults (and college-aged adults cared equally as much as post-college-aged adults). 
This supports our prediction that differences in the influence of guilt or innocence between 
adolescents and adults would not be due to a difference in values. Importantly, our regression 
analysis confirms our prediction that adolescents values relating to guilt and innocence are not 
being retrieved during their decision making. Specifically, in our adolescent sample there was no 
correlation between the importance of “I would not plead guilty to a crime I did not commit” and 
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plea decisions made regarding crimes they did not commit (crimes they were innocent of). This 
suggests that adolescents are not responsive to guilt or innocence because they are failing to 
retrieve and apply appropriate values during their plea decision making (see Fujita & Han, 2009).  
Limitations and Future Directions 
 This study builds on previous work relating to plea decision making in adolescents, and 
provides support for FTTs predictions that adolescents are likely to be less responsive than adults 
to guilt or innocence, but more responsive to superficial incentives such as receiving one year of 
probation rather than two. However, our findings must be interpreted in light of some limitations. 
 First, our samples were drawn from populations that do not necessarily reflect the 
populations that those who make plea decisions most frequently come from. Future research 
should examine these ideas in populations of adjudicated individuals. Second, our experiment 
involved hypothetical plea vignettes and asking participants to imagine that they were guilty or 
innocent. There is support for the idea that cognitive tasks do predict real-life risk taking (see 
Reyna et al., 2011), and using hypothetical situations allowed us to implement a controlled 
design and run a randomized control trial. In addition, research examining real decisions made 
by criminal defendants supports the finding that adolescents are likely to plead guilty when 
innocent more often than adults (Zottoli, Daftary-Kapur, Winters, & Hogan, 2016).  
However, it is still important to note that our vignettes did differ from rea plea decisions in 
important ways – for example, participants did not really have to face the consequences of the 
decision that they made, participants were not truly guilty or innocent of the crimes in the 
vignettes based on their assigned group, participants did not have advice from an attorney, and 
participants were not influenced by other pressures that might be present when making a real 
plea decision. In the future, experimental work should continue to be combined with empirical 
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analysis of plea cases (to the extent such data can be gathered) and interviews with defendants 
and attorneys, to gain a full picture of plea decision-making.  
Implications for the Criminal Justice System.  
 The findings of this study could have important implications for the criminal justice 
system, and in particular the juvenile justice system and the practice of trying juveniles in adult 
court. First, results can provide insight in cases in which a juvenile is attempting to withdraw a 
plea and claims that they pled guilty when they were innocent (see Singleton, 2007). 
Accumulating research showing that juveniles are more likely than adults to plead guilty to 
crimes they did not commit, and the conditions under which this is most likely, should be 
presented in court to support arguments that adolescents pled guilty when innocent.  
Another implication may be that adolescents should not be restricted in making claims of 
innocence following a plea bargain, to recognize their increased susceptibility to pleading guilty 
when innocent due to cognitive and social development.   
Second, findings can provide insight into regulations that may make plea bargaining 
more fair and less coercive for juveniles. One relatively conservative option would be to move to 
a system focused on sentence-bargaining rather than charge-bargaining for juveniles, and to 
require certain non-superficial distinctions between a plea and an expected sentence at trial. The 
idea of sentence bargaining is that prosecutors can file only the most appropriate charge and 
reserve any bargaining for sentencing recommendations (Alschuler, 1976). This would mean that 
prosecutors could not threaten a felony conviction at trial, and offer a misdemeanor in exchange 
for pleading guilty. Our results suggest that where this is not done, adolescents are more 
responsive to whether they are guilty or innocent. In addition, forcing a non-superficial 
distinction between plea and trial would protect adolescents from being influenced by superficial 
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incentives due to their cognitive processing style. Attorney advice could also be helpful in 
reducing this risk, and has been shown to influence defendant decisions in previous research 
(Viljoen, Klaver, & Roesch, 2005).  
Finally, the findings, when taken alongside other findings relating to juvenile plea 
bargaining may suggest that the law on plea bargaining in juveniles should be changed. Current 
law does not include developmental factors as relevant to whether an adolescent can plea bargain 
– for example if an adolescent makes a decision that is not based on values, this does not matter 
provided they had necessary levels of understanding, reasoning, and appreciation (see Grisso et. 
at., 2003). However, this decision making could be akin to not being able to decide in accordance 
with what adolescents really want, and this may be particularly problematic when the decisions 
made as adolescents are likely to continue to affect them into their adult years (either directly or 
indirectly). Any abolition of plea bargaining for juveniles would have to be done in such a way 
that the benefits that can be gained through pleading guilty (such as reduced sentences, see 
Bowers, 2008) would not be lost. However, research increasingly suggests that in the same way 
as they are too young to vote, too young to drink alcohol, and too young to rent a home, perhaps 
adolescents are too young to plead guilty.  
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Abstract 
 
 
Although much research has examined the role of cognitive biases in legal-decision making, 
cognitive biases in plea decisions have received little to no attention. Over two experiments, we 
examine how one cognitive bias, the anchoring heuristic, might be influencing plea decisions of 
defendants and plea advice of attorneys, using predictions informed by Fuzzy-Trace Theory. As 
predicted, providing numerical anchors to defendants significantly impacted innocent 
defendant’s decisions but not guilty defendant’s decisions. Importantly, this led to innocent 
defendants pleading guilty more often than guilty defendants under certain predicted conditions. 
Results also show that attorney advice may be more robust to anchoring effects that defendant’s 
decisions, suggesting a protective effect of attorney advice against anchoring biases. These 
results provide important insight into injustices that may arise from the current plea system, and 
policy recommendations are made accordingly. 
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Guilty or Biased? When Innocence, But Not Guilt, Can Lead to Pleading Guilty 
 
Despite the importance of plea-bargaining in our current criminal justice system, to our 
knowledge no studies have examined the cognitive biases that could influence a defendant’s plea 
decisions. This is important, since cognitive biases have been shown to have significant 
influence on many other legal decisions, including the decisions of judges (Guthrie, Rachlinski, 
& Wistrich, 2001), arbitrators (Helm, Wistrich, & Rachlinski, 2016), jurors (Chapman & 
Bornstein, 1996; Helm & Dunlea, 2015; Sood, 2013), and even eye-witnesss (Bringham, 
Bennett, Meissner, & Mitchell, 2014; Caputo & Dunning, 2014; Helm, Ceci, & Burd, 2016).  
In this article, we examine the influence of one particular cognitive bias – anchoring – on 
plea decisions made by a sample of adults (Experiment 1), and plea advice given by a sample of 
attorneys (Experiment 2). We begin by describing the literature on anchoring, with a focus on 
anchoring in the legal context. We then describe the plea-bargaining process and how numerical 
anchors may be introduced in the plea-bargaining process. We then introduce fuzzy-trace theory 
and outline predictions that innocent defendants are likely to be more influenced by anchors than 
guilty defendants. Based on these predictions, we design and run a study to examine the effects 
of numerical anchors on guilty and not guilty defendants, and attorneys who suspect that their 
clients are either guilty or not guilty. Results support predictions by showing that innocent 
defendants are more likely than guilty defendants to be influenced by anchors in the plea 
bargaining process, and also suggests that attorney advice may be more resistant to anchoring 
and therefore may have a protective effect against plea decisions resulting from cognitive biases.  
The Anchoring Heuristic 
Biasing factors can influence judgment and decision-making. One common biasing factor 
is the anchoring heuristic (Kahneman, 2011). Anchors are initial values that can bias subsequent 
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numerical judgments by being used as a starting point that people fail to sufficiently adjust from  
(Chapman & Johnson, 1999; Helm, Hans, & Reyna, in press). The initial value tends to “anchor” 
final judgments so that even when people conclude that an anchor provides no useful 
information, mentally testing the validity of the anchor causes people to adjust their estimates 
upward or downward based on that anchor (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974; Guthrie, Rachlinski, & 
Wistrich, 2001).  This has been shown to occur even when an anchor is randomly generated and 
has no probative value in the decision participants are making. For example, in an early study of 
anchoring, participants were asked to estimate the percentage of African countries in the United 
Nations (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). A starting value between – and 100 was determined by 
spinning a wheel of fortune, which was pre-set to land on either ten or sixty-five, in the 
participants’ presence. Participants were asked to indicate whether this arbitrary starting value 
was too high or too low, and then to reach their estimate of the correct percentage. When the 
wheel landed on sixty-five, participants gave a median estimate of 45% of African countries in 
the United Nations, when the wheel landed on ten participants gave a median estimate of 25% of 
African countries in the United Nations (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974).  
In the legal context, a biasing effect of anchors has been shown in the context of 
sentencing where, for example, experimental studies have shown an influence of anchors on 
judges when sentencing defendants, even when they are told that an initial sentencing suggestion 
given as an anchor was a mistake (Englich & Mussewiler, 2001) and even when an anchor was 
determined through a random process that was entirely transparent to them (Englich, 
Mussweiler, & Strack, 2006). In the damage award context, it has been shown that in personal 
injury cases anchors systematically influence the compensation awarded to a plaintiff by jurors 
(Chapman & Bornstein, 1996; Hans, Helm, & Reyna, in preparation; Reyna et al., 2014), and by 
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judges (Guthrie, Rachlinski, & Wistrich, 2001). Similarly, in settlement talks, litigants can be 
influenced by the initial offers of their adversaries. A small initial offer can make a final offer 
appear more generous and make it more likely it will be accepted by a litigant (Korobkin & 
Guthrie, 1994). Rules have evolved to limit the influence of irrelevant influences in this domain 
and training programs for legal professionals have been put in place to help them avoid such 
influences, although these have not eliminated the potential for bias (Englich, 2006).  
Anchoring in the Plea-Bargaining Process.  
 In its simplest form, the plea-bargaining process involves a defendant being accused of a 
crime, and the prosecutor making a plea offer to the defense attorney, who then conveys this to 
the defendant who must decide whether to accept the offer (Caldwell, 2011).  Where a details of 
a plea offer change either based on negotiations or changes in evidence in a case, anchoring is 
likely to occur. There are two primary ways in which anchoring is likely to influence plea 
decisions. First, through the practice of overcharging (Blume & Helm, 2014; Caldwell, 2011; 
Kellough & Wortley, 2002; Ross, 1978). This involves the unreasonable multiplying of charges 
against a defendant, or charging with a more serious offense than the circumstances of the case 
warrant (Alschuler, 1968). Beginning the plea bargaining process with these more serious 
charges, can make lesser charges appear less bad, and thus encourage a defendant to plead guilty. 
Anchoring can also influence plea decisions through probability estimates given to defendants. 
This is particularly problematic since there is frequently an information imbalance between the 
defense and the prosecution, such that the prosecution has more information about the likelihood 
of conviction than the defendant (Blume & Helm, 2014; Douglass, 2001; Hashimoto, 2008). This 
means that a defendants estimate of their chances of conviction may change, either as a result of 
attorney advice or their own reasoning. An initial estimate of the probability of conviction could 
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serve as an anchor, making a subsequent estimate look either smaller or larger than it would 
otherwise.  
Fuzzy-Trace Theory and the Differential Impact of Anchoring on Guilty and Innocent 
Defendants. 
In order to explore the potential biasing effect of anchors on plea decisions, we use fuzzy-
trace theory (FTT), a dual process theory of memory and decision-making (Helm & Reyna, in 
press; Reyna, 2012). According to FTT, when an individual encodes information and uses it to 
make a decision, they can do so in one of two ways – using gist-based processing or verbatim-
based processing (Helm & Reyna, in press; Reyna, 2012; Reyna & Brainerd, 2011). Gist-based 
processing is processing that draws on representations that capture essential meaning that a 
person derives from information (Reyna et al., 2014). This means that the processing is fuzzy 
and impressionistic (Reyna, 2012). Verbatim-based processing is processing drawing on 
representations that are literal, verdical, and detailed, such as exact wording and precise numbers 
(Reyna et al., 2014). One of the implications of gist-based processing is that numbers are 
inherently relative – both the number itself and its context become important (Reyna et al., 
2014). When considering whether to go bungee jumping, an individual relying on verbatim-
based processing might conduct a direct trade off of risks and rewards involving precise 
probabilities (e.g. a 10% chance of rain, and a 10% chance of death) (Helm, Hans, & Reyna, in 
press). In contrast, an individual relying on gist would be likely to consider a low chance of rain 
and a high chance of death (Helm, Hans, & Reyna, in press). Put another way, the gist of a 
number can be different depending on its context (see Reyna, 2013; Reyna & Lloyd, 2006). This 
means that a risk of 12% might be perceived as low relative to 20%, but perceived as high 
relative to 4% (see Reyna et. al., 2014; Windschitl, Martin, & Flugstad, 2002).   
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Gist-based processing has been shown to be developmentally advanced, and to have a 
protective effect against unhealthy risk taking (Reyna & Ellis, 1994; Reyna, Chick, Corbin, & 
Hsia, 2015). However, the influence of context also makes individuals relying on gist more 
prone to biases caused by context such as framing effects, the conjunction fallacy, confirmatory 
bias, and anchoring (see, for example, Helm & Reyna, in press; Liberali, Reyna, Furlan, Stein, & 
Pardo, 2012; Reyna, 1991; Reyna et al., 2014; Reyna et al, 2015). Individuals relying on 
verbatim are less influenced by these biases since they are not influenced by context and relative 
meaning (Helm & Reyna, in press). Reliance on gist or verbatim-based processing can be 
influenced by individual differences, and also by the nature of a decision given to participants 
(Brainerd & Reyna, 2005; Reyna, 2012). In the context of plea-bargaining, individuals who have 
really committed the crimes that they are pleading guilty to are likely to be influenced primarily 
by the concrete details of a plea deal (i.e. what is the best outcome that I can get given that I 
committed this crime”).  
Individuals who are innocent are likely to be influenced by the details of a plea bargain 
but also influenced by a desire to not plead guilty to a crime that they did not commit. Thus 
innocent defendants are predicted to engage in more fuzzy and impressionistic processing 
involving reliance on gist, while guilty defendants are predicted to engage in more specific and 
detail oriented processing. This has important implications for the impact of biases such as 
anchoring on guilty and innocent defendants, as it suggests that innocent defendants may be 
more influenced by these biases than guilty defendants.  
It is also important to consider the impact of anchors on attorneys, whose advice may be 
influenced by the same anchors that defendant’s decisions are influenced by. Attorneys may have 
an advantage over defendants in avoiding anchoring biases because although experience in an 
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area has been associated with increased reliance on gist and thus increased gist-based biases (see 
for example Reyna et al., 2015), attorneys deal with plea offers frequently and so may have a 
more robust idea of the contextual meaning of specific numbers and details of plea offers that 
can not so easily be influenced by one anchor.   
The Current Study 
 In the current study, we use hypothetical plea decisions to probe the influence of anchors 
on those accused of crimes (Experiment 1), and attorneys representing those accused of crimes 
(Experiment 2). We introduce anchors based on initial estimates of the probability of conviction 
in a case, and then ask all participants to make a final decision in a case with a fixed probability 
of conviction at trial. We ask those accused of hypothetical crimes to decide how they would 
plead in these hypotheticals, and attorneys what advice they would give to a client in these 
hypotheticals.  
Based on FTT, and specifically the reasoning described above, we predict that: 
1. Innocent defendants will rely on less precise trade offs of risk and reward due to a focus 
on values in addition to specific details of a plea. 
2. Innocent defendants will be more influenced by anchors than guilty defendants. 
3. Attorney advice will be less influenced by anchors than the decisions of those accused of 
a crime.  
Experiment 1 Method and Results 
Experiment 1 Method 
 
Participants. Participants were 151 adults recruited from the participant pool at Cornell 
University. Participants completed the study online and participation took around 15 minutes. 
Participants received course credit for their participation. Participants ranged in age from 18 – 23 
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years old (M = 19.47, SD = 1.09), and were 71.4% female. All participants provided consent to 
take part in the study, and the project was approved by the Cornell Institutional Review Board.  
The Plea-Decision Task. Participants were given a hypothetical plea vignette involving a 
theft. They were told they had been accused of grand theft (a felony) and would have to decide 
whether to plead guilty or go to trial. By pleading guilty they would get a misdemeanor for sure 
(for petty theft), and by going to trial they were risking a felony conviction (for grand theft), 
which they would receive if convicted. They were also given a short description of relevant laws 
including the distinction between felonies and misdemeanors. Participants were either told that 
they were guilty of petty theft (our guilty condition), or not guilty of theft at all (our not guilty 
condition). They were given an initial estimate of the probability of conviction at trial – either 
10%, 30%, or 70%. This initial probability acted as our anchor – the 10% probability was 
intended to make the 30% probability in a later decision look big, and the 70% probability was 
intended to make the 30% probability in a later decision look small. Participants were asked to 
make an initial decision based on this information as to whether they thought they would want to 
plead guilty or not guilty. After making an initial decision about what they would do, participants 
were told that there had been a change in the case and there was now a 30% chance they would 
be convicted at trial. They were then asked to make a final decision about whether they would 
plead guilty to petty theft, or go to trial and have a 70% chance of no conviction and a 30% 
chance of a felony theft conviction. This gave a 2 guilt (guilty or not guilty) x 3 anchor (10% 
anchor, 30% anchor, or 70% anchor) design. After making their final plea decision, participants 
were asked for their confidence in that decision on a scale from 1 (not at all confident) to 10 
(extremely confident). We used this to calculate signed confidence – a measure ranging from -10 
(completely confident in going to trial) to +10 (completely confident in pleading guilty).     
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Value Ratings. In order to test our prediction that not guilty individuals would be more 
driven by values, we also asked our participants to rate the importance of two values relating to 
guilt and innocence – “I would not plead guilty to a crime I did not commit,” and “If I have 
done something wrong I think I should admit it.” Participants rated the importance of these 
statements to them on a 7-point scale from 1 (not at all important) – 7 (extremely important). 
Experiment 1 Results 
 
We conducted our primary analyses examining the influence of our manipulations on 
plea decisions using an analysis of variance (ANOVA) design, to easily compare our plea 
decision results to our signed confidence plea decision results, and our confidence results, and 
because ANOVAs are robust to having a dichotomous outcome variable (see Lunney, 1970; 
Cleary & Angel, 1984). We also ran a logistic regression with effects coding to check our 
ANOVA results, and significant results from our ANOVAs remained significant.  
The relationship between probability, guilt, and initial plea decisions. As 
background, we conducted an analysis of variance, examining the influence of guilt and 
innocence, and probability of conviction (10% chance of conviction at trial, 30% chance of 
conviction at trial, or 70% chance of conviction at trial) on the decision to go to trial (coded as 0) 
or plead guilty (coded as 1) in the initial plea decision that participants made. This analysis 
revealed a main effect of probability (F(2,147)=14.528, p<.001, ηp2 = .165). When there was a 
70% probability of conviction at trial, participants pled guilty significantly more than when there 
was a 10% probability of conviction at trial (p<.001) and than when there was a 30% probability 
of conviction at trial (p<.001). This analysis also revealed a significant two-way interaction 
between guilt and probability (F(2,147)=8.704, p<.001, ηp2 = .106) (Figure 1). Participants in the 
not guilty condition showed no effect of probability of conviction on plea decisions 
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(F(2,75)=1.985, p=.145, ηp2 = .050). Participants in the guilty condition showed a significant 
main effect of probability of conviction on plea decisions (F(2,72)=27.174, p<.001, ηp2 = .430). 
When there was a 70% chance of conviction, participants pled guilty significantly more than 
when there was a 10% chance of conviction (p<.001) or than when there was a 30% chance of 
conviction (p<.001). When there was a 30% chance of conviction, participants pled guilty 
significantly more than when there was a 10% chance of conviction (p=.001). This meant that 
when there was a 30% chance of conviction, there was no significant effect of guilt (p = .210, ηp2 
= .032), when there was a 10% chance of conviction not guilty participants pled guilty more 
often (p=.001, ηp2 = .208) and when there was a 70% chance of conviction guilty participants 
pled guilty more often (p=.025, ηp2 = .100).  
 
Figure 1. Significant two-way interaction between probability of conviction and guilt of 
participant. *p<.05. Error bars represent +/1 one standard error.  
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The relationship between anchors, guilt, and final plea decisions. We conducted an 
analysis of variance, examining the influence of guilt and innocence, and anchor (original 
estimate of probability of conviction at trial – 10% chance of conviction at trial, 30% chance of 
conviction at trial, or 70% chance of conviction at trial) on the decision to go to trial (coded as 0) 
or plead guilty (coded as 1) in the final plea decision (in which every participant was told they 
had a 30% chance of being convicted at trial).  
 Results revealed a significant two-way interaction between guilt and anchor (F(2,145) = 
9.907, p <.001, ηp2 = .120) (Figure 2). Follow-up comparisons showed that anchor significantly 
influenced not guilty participants (F(2,75)= 13.099, p <.001, ηp2 = .259), but did not significantly 
influence guilty participants (F(2,70)=1.027, p=.363, ηp2 = .029). In the not guilty condition, 
participants pled guilty significantly more often when they had seen an initial estimate of a 10% 
chance of conviction, compared to when they had seen an initial estimate of a 30% chance of 
conviction (p=.001) and compared to when they had seen an initial estimate of a 70% chance of 
conviction (p<.001). This meant that when participants initially saw an anchor of 70% chance of 
conviction, they pled guilty significantly more often when they were guilty (p=.023, ηp2 = .103). 
When participants initially saw an anchor of 30% (the same as the final estimate), there was no 
significant difference in pleads based on guilt or innocence. When participants initially saw an 
anchor of 10% chance of conviction, they pled guilty significantly more often when they were 
not guilty (p<.001, ηp2 = .243).  The main effects of guilt and anchor were not significant.  
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Figure 2. Significant two-way interaction between anchor and guilt of participant. *p<.05. Error 
bars represent +/1 one standard error.  
 
 
We then conducted the same analysis using our signed confidence measure, from -10 
(complete confidence in going to trial) – 10 (complete confidence in pleading guilty). This 
analysis revealed a main effect of probability (F(2,145) = 3.688, p=.027, ηp2 =.048). When 
participants had previously seen a 10% chance of conviction anchor, they were significantly less 
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decision with a 30% chance of conviction than when they had previously seen a 70% chance of 
conviction anchor (M10% = -1.082, SE = .829, M70% = -4.165, SE = .829, p= .009). This analysis 
also revealed an interaction between guilt and probability (F(2,145)=10.826, p<.001, ηp2 =.130). 
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(from 1 (not at all confident) – 10 (completely confident)). This analysis revealed no significant 
main-effects or interactions.  
The relationships between values and plea decisions in guilty and not guilty 
participants. Overall, the mean importance rating on our 7-point scale for the principle “I would 
not plead guilty to a crime I did not commit” was 5.51, SD = 1.63 (M = 5.69, SD = 1.6 in the not 
guilty condition, and M = 5.32, SD = 1.65 in the guilty condition), the mean importance rating 
for “If I have done something wrong, I think I should admit it” was 4.69, SD = 1.94 (M = 4.70, 
SD = 2.05 in the not guilty condition, and M = 4.68, SD  = 1.83 in the guilty condition). To 
examine whether participants in the not guilty condition were engaging in more qualitative, 
value-driven processing than those in the guilty condition, we investigated the relationship 
between the participant’s value ratings and plea decisions in participants in our guilty condition 
and our not guilty condition. Relevant values were “I would not plead guilty to a crime I did not 
commit” and “If I have done something wrong then I think that I should admit it.”  
 In our guilty condition, there was no significant relationship between the endorsement of 
either value, and plea decisions. Participants who pled guilty and participants who chose to go to 
trial did not significantly differ in the extent to which they endorsed either principle 
(F(1,72)=.012, p= .912, ηp2 = .00 and F(1,72)=.819, p=.368, ηp2 = .011, for “I would not plead 
guilty to a crime I did not commit” and “If I have done something wrong then I think I should 
admit it,” respectively). In our not guilty condition, participants who went to trial rated the 
principle “I would not plead guilty to a crime I did not commit,” more highly than those who 
pled guilty (Mtrial = 5.96 SD = 1.94 Mplea = 5.12, SD = 1.34, F(1,76)=4.912, p=.03, ηp2 = .061). 
They did not differ in the extent to which they endorsed “If I have done something wrong I 
should admit it” (F(1,76)=.090, p = .765, ηp2 = .001).  
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Experiment 2 Method and Results 
Experiment 2 Method 
 
Participants. Participants were 189 criminal defense attorneys, recruited via defense 
attorney listservs in New York, Tennessee, Wisconsin, Wyoming, Vermont, Idaho, Iowa, 
Arizona, and Rhode Island. Participants completed the study online and participation took 
around 10 minutes. Participants received a small amount of monetary compensation for their 
participation. Participants were 57.6% male. All participants provided consent to take part in the 
study, and the project was approved by the Cornell Institutional Review Board.  
The Plea-Decision Task. Participants were given a hypothetical plea vignette involving a 
theft. They were told to imagine that they were representing a client who had been accused of 
grand theft (a felony) and the client had to decide between pleading guilty and going to trial.  
By pleading guilty they would get a misdemeanor for sure (for petty theft), and by going to trial 
they were risking a felony conviction (for grand theft), which they would receive if convicted. 
Participants were either told to imagine that they suspect the client is guilty of petty theft (our 
guilty condition) or not guilty of theft at all (our not guilty condition). They were given an initial 
estimate of the probability of conviction at trial – either 10%, or 30%. This initial probability 
acted as our anchor. Attorneys were asked what they would advise the client in this situation – to 
plead guilty or to go to trial. After making this initial decision about what they would advise the 
client in this situation, they were told that there had been a change in the case and there was now 
a 30% chance the client would be convicted at trial. They were then asked to indicate whether 
they would advise the client to plead guilty to petty theft, or go to trial and have a 70% chance of 
no conviction and a 30% chance of a felony theft conviction. This gave a 2 guilt (guilty or not 
guilty) x 2 anchor (10% anchor, 30% anchor) design. After deciding on their final advice, 
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attorneys were asked for their confidence in this advice on a scale from 1 (not at all confident) to 
10 (extremely confident). We used this to calculate signed confidence – a measure ranging from 
-10 (completely confident in advising the client to go to trial) to +10 (completely confident in 
advising the client to plead guilty).     
Experiment 2 Results 
We first conducted an analysis of variance examining the influence of our two between-
subject’s factors – guilt (suspect client is guilty or suspect client is innocent) and probability of 
conviction (10% or 30%) on attorneys’ plea advice in the initial decision they made (where the 
probability of conviction was 10% in the 10% conviction, and 30% in the 30% condition).  This 
ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of guilt, such that attorneys advised clients to plead 
guilty more often when they suspected that they were guilty (Mguilty =.340 SE = .040, Mnotguilty = 
.127, SE = .041, F(1,200)=13.91, p<.001, ηp2 =.065). In addition, the ANOVA revealed a 
significant main effect of probability, such that attorneys advised clients to plead guilty more 
often when there was a 30% chance of conviction at trial, compared to a 10% chance (M10% = 
.165, SE = .041, M30% = .302, SE = .040, F(1,200)=5.70, p = .018, ηp2 =.028).  
Next, we conducted the ANOVA looking at the influence of guilt (guilty or not guilty) 
and anchor (the initial probability of conviction an attorney had seen – 10% or 30%) on their 
advice in their subsequent decision, where the probability of conviction was 30%. This ANOVA 
revealed a main effect of guilt, such that attorneys advised clients to plead guilty more often 
when they suspected that they were guilty (Mguilty =.408 SE = .047, Mnotguilty = .208, SE = .046, 
F(1,185)=9.181, p=.003, ηp2 =.047). There was no significant main effect of anchor, although the 
trend was that attorneys would advise clients to plead guilty more often when they had 
previously seen an anchor of a 10% probability of conviction (M10%anchor = .349, SE = .046, 
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M30%anchor = .268, SE = .047, F(1,185) =1.510, p = .221, ηp2 =.008). There was no significant 
interaction between guilt and anchor.  
We then conducted the same analysis using our signed confidence measure, from -10 
(complete confidence in advising the client to go to trial) – 10 (complete confidence advising the 
client to plead guilty). Again, this analysis revealed a main effect of guilt, such that attorneys 
were more confident in advising clients to go to trial when they suspected that they were not 
guilty (Mguilty = -1.354, SE = .666, Mnotguilty = -4.240 SE = .656, F(1,185)=9.520, p=.002, ηp2 
=.049). Again, the main effect of probability was in the expected direction but was not 
significant (F(1,185)=2.580, p = .110, ηp2 =.014), and the interaction between guilt and 
probability was not significant.  
Finally, we used the same predictors (guilt and anchor) to predict attorney’s confidence in 
their plea advice (from 1 (not at all confident) – 10 (completely confident)). This analysis 
revealed one significant effect – a significant interaction between guilt and anchor 
(F(1,185)=9.059, p = .003, ηp2 =.047) (Figure 3).  
 
Figure 3. Significant two-way interaction between anchor and guilt of participant when 
predicting confidence in advice. *p<.05. Error bars represent +/1 one standard error.  
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When attorneys had previously seen an estimate of a 10% probability of conviction, their 
confidence in their advice was not influenced by whether they suspected the client was guilty or 
innocent (p = .195, ηp2 =.018). When attorneys had previously seen an estimate of a 30% 
probability of conviction, they were more confident in their advice when the suspect was not 
guilty (p = .005, ηp2 =.083).  
Discussion 
 
In this paper, we tested the influence of the anchoring heuristic, in the form of pre-
estimates of the probability of conviction at trial given, on defendants making hypothetical plea 
decisions and on attorneys advising hypothetical defendants making plea decisions. We predicted 
that guilty defendants would be more likely to engage in more precise cognitive processing, 
weighing up risks and rewards when making plea decisions, whereas innocent defendants would 
be more likely to engage in fuzzier processing, influenced not only by the details of the plea deal 
itself but also by values such as not wanting to plead guilty to something that you haven’t done. 
This was predicted to lead to innocent defendants being more influenced by the anchoring 
heuristic, which is expected influence those relying on fuzzier processing to a greater extent (see 
Hans & Reyna, 2011; Reyna et al., 2014). Finally, we predicted that attorneys may be less 
influenced by an anchor in a particular case because even if attorneys rely on fuzzier processing, 
they have other anchors influencing them too – for example probabilities and outcomes in 
previous cases that they have worked in. Results provided support for each of these predictions.  
Guilty Defendants Rely More on Precise Details 
When making their initial plea decisions, our mock defendants were in one of three 
groups – a group in which there was a 10% probability of conviction, a group in which there was 
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a 30% chance of probability of conviction, or a group in which there was a 70% chance of 
conviction. All mock defendants were told that they would get a misdemeanor for sure if they 
pled guilty, but would get a felony conviction if convicted at trial. Importantly, in these scenarios 
we saw that innocent participants were not significantly influenced by the probability of 
conviction, but guilty participants were – pleading guilty most often when there was a 70% 
chance of conviction at trial, and least often when there was a 10% chance of conviction at trial.  
The fact that guilty defendants are sensitive to changes in the probability of conviction supports 
our prediction that guilty defendants are conducting precise trade offs of risk and reward, while 
the fact that innocent defendants are not sensitive to these changes supports our prediction that 
they are influenced by something more abstract than precise trade offs, such as underlying values 
(e.g. I do not want to plead guilty to something that I did not do).  This was further confirmed by 
the results of our correlational analysis, where innocent defendants were pleading guilty less 
often the more they endorsed the principle “I would not plead guilty to a crime I did not 
commit,” whereas guilty defendants showed no relationship between endorsing the principle “If I 
have done something wrong then I think I should admit it,” and plea decisions.  This suggests 
that innocent defendants are engaging in fuzzier, value driven decision making, while guilty 
defendants are engaging in more precise trading off of risks and rewards.  
Innocent Defendants Are More Influenced by Anchors 
 Results also support our prediction that this reliance on fuzzier, value driven decision 
making will make innocent defendants more susceptible to the anchoring heuristic. After all 
participants had made a decision in our initial plea vignette (with a 10%, 30%, or 70% chance of 
conviction at trial), they all made a final decision in which they were told that there was a 30% 
chance of conviction at trial. We expected that for defendants relying on fuzzier processing, 
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having seen a 10% anchor previously would make the 30% chance of conviction look big, while 
having seen a 70% anchor would make the 30% look small, and the anchors would influence 
decisions accordingly (leading to more guilty pleas for those who had seen the 10% anchor, and 
less guilty pleas for those who had seen the 70% anchor). This prediction was confirmed by our 
results. Specifically, mock defendants in our guilty condition were not influenced by our anchor 
manipulation but mock defendants in our not guilty condition were, pleading guilty more when 
they had seen the 10% anchor and pleading guilty less when they had seen the 70% anchor. 
Importantly, the result of this was that when the 10% anchor had previously been seen, innocent 
defendants pled guilty significantly more often than guilty defendants. Signed confidence results 
also displayed this trend, supporting the validity of the finding.  
The Influence of Anchors On Attorneys 
 Our results show that, as predicted, anchors influenced attorneys less than they influenced 
mock defendants. This may be because attorneys were reasoning in a more precise way, although 
existing research suggests those with more expertise tend to reason in a more fuzzy way (see 
Reyna, et al., 2015). Therefore, it may be that as predicted, attorneys are protected from 
anchoring effects in a single case because they also have other relevant reference anchors from 
other cases. It is important to note, that while our attorneys were not significantly influenced by 
our anchor condition, they showed a trend in the same direction as our mock defendants and so 
may not be completely immune from the influence of anchors. Future research should investigate 
this in more detail. In addition, attorneys were influenced by whether they suspected that a client 
was guilty or innocent, even when the probability of conviction at trial remained the same. 
Attorneys confidence in their plea advice was also influenced by the presence of an anchor and 
the suspected guilt of the client. Attorneys were particularly confident in their advice when they 
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had not seen a previous different anchor (but had seen the 30% chance of conviction in both 
decisions) and where they suspected the client was not guilty. Future research should explore 
why this is the case, and the influence that it could have on plea decisions.  
Limitations and Future Directions 
 This study provides initial support for the contention that innocent defendants may be 
processing plea deals in a fuzzier way and thus may be more influenced by associated heuristics 
and biases (such as the anchoring heuristic). It also suggests that attorney advice may have a 
protective effect against influence of anchors. However, our findings must be interpreted in light 
of some limitations. First, our study participants were all young adults and were not drawn from 
an adjudicated population. Future research should test our predictions in a wider sample pool, 
and in particular in an adjudicated population, in order to ensure results apply to the populations 
who are likely to be making plea decisions. Secondly, our plea vignettes were hypothetical and 
so might not reflect what people would do if they were really in these situations. For example, 
our hypotheticals did not involve interaction with an attorney (or interaction with a defendant in 
the case of the attorneys), having to really suffer the consequences of a decision, or considering 
external pressures such as the financial and time costs of trial. Future work should combine this 
experimental research with interviews of attorneys and criminal defendants, to further explore 
this phenomenon and confirm the extent to which it exists in real cases. Finally, we only examine 
one type of heuristic in this study, the anchoring heuristic. Future work should examine the 
influence of other heuristics, such as framing and base-rate neglect, that are also predicted to 
influence those relying on fuzzier processing to a greater extent.  
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Importance for the Criminal Justice System.  
 If confirmed by future research, the findings of this study have important implications for 
the criminal justice system. Our results also suggest that defendant’s exposure to non-relevant 
anchors should be limited to avoid biases based on these anchors. This may mean avoiding 
giving probability estimates or estimates of a “low” or “high” chance of conviction to defendants 
until the accuracy of these estimates is as clear as possible. One way to facilitate this may be to 
mandate increased and open discovery during plea negotiations, as suggested by Professor 
Stephanos Bibas (Bibas, 2004). This would put defense counsel in the position to be able to 
provide clients with estimates as to the likelihood of conviction at trial accurately, and 
efficiently. Another way to facilitate this would be to reduce the ability of prosecutors to threaten 
serious felony charges in cases where they are not an appropriate final charge. In these cases, the 
initial felony threat may act as an anchor and influence the perception of future possible 
outcomes at trial or plea offers.  
 These findings may also be used by defendants who pled guilty and subsequently want to 
argue that they were actually innocent (although note that this is difficult to do, see Blume & 
Helm, 2014). The findings can provide insight into the role of cognitive bias in decisions to plead 
guilty, and the types of cases in which innocent defendants are likely to be influenced by these 
biases. The findings can also be utilized by attorneys who should be willing to share advice with 
clients and put probabilities and magnitudes in a particular case in context. If attorneys are 
indeed less influenced by cognitive biases, their advice, if deployed correctly, could protect 
clients from these biases. 
In addition to these more conservative implications and suggestions, the findings of this 
study cut at the heart of justifications for the practice of plea bargaining. The traditional model of 
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plea decision making is known as the bargaining in the shadow of trial model (Bibas, 2004; 
Bushway, Redlich, & Norris, 2014). This is a rational actor model (Bushway, Redlich, & Norris, 
2014). That is, a defendant is expected to plead guilty if an offered sentence is less than or equal 
to her expected value of going to trial. For example, if the expected sentence if convicted is 10 
years and there is an 80% chance of trial, then a plea to a sentence of less than 8 years (80% of 
10) represents a rational choice for a risk-neutral defendant (a defendant not affected by the 
degree of uncertainty in a choice) (Helm & Reyna, 2017). This model presumes that defendants 
are trading off probabilities of conviction at trial (risks) and consequences. This model has been 
used to justify plea bargaining, and in particular the practice of innocent defendants pleading 
guilty, because defendants can conduct a costs and benefits analysis based on a plea offer and the 
probable outcome at trial. This means that defendants are expected to plead guilty when this is a 
more valuable and better option for them (Bowers, 2008).  Our results suggest that while guilty 
defendants might be engaging in this type of processing, innocent defendants are not. If innocent 
defendants cannot engage in this costs and benefits analysis, they are likely to be pleading guilty 
when doing so is not the right option based on such an analysis, and even in cases where the 
probability of conviction at trial is low. As our results indicate this could even lead to innocent 
defendants pleading guilty more often than guilty defendants, particularly in situations where it is 
unlikely they would be found guilty at trial.  In its extreme case, this could lead to a system that 
convicts more innocent defendants than guilty ones, undermining core principles of the criminal 
justice system.  
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Abstract 
 
Existing research has shown that innocent defendants are pleading guilty, and that this may 
sometimes be a sensible option given the current system. In this study, we interview criminal 
defense attorneys to investigate the extent to which innocent defendants are pleading guilty, the 
situations in which this may be the right thing for them to do given the current system, and the 
relationship between attorney advice and innocent defendants pleading guilty.  Results suggest 
that attorneys are often limited in the extent to which they can really negotiate justice for their 
clients due to the nature of the current system, in which the sensible option may be to plead 
guilty even when innocent and even when the chances of conviction are not high, due to the 
threat of serious consequences at trial compared to the consequences of a plea. In addition, 
results suggest that attorneys are reluctant to impose risks on a client by advising taking a case to 
trial. Recommendations for the current system are made based on these findings.  
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Limitations on the Ability to Negotiate Justice: Attorney Perspectives on Plea Bargaining’s 
Innocence Problem 
 
Negotiated pleas, where a defendant agrees to plead guilty in exchange for a reduced sentence 
rather than exercise their right to a jury trial, became the primary means of disposing of criminal 
cases in the late 1960s and early 1970s as a result of rising crime rates (Blume & Helm, 2014; 
Stuntz, 2006). By 2015, 97.1% of federal cases that were resolved were resolved via a plea 
agreement between the prosecutor and the defendant rather than a jury trial (United States 
Sentencing Commission 2014 Sourcebook). This practice is well-known and often accepted as 
an efficient way to dispose of cases. For example, in the case of Missouri v Frye, Justice 
Kennedy, speaking for a majority of the court stated that “The potential to conserve valuable 
prosecutorial resources and for defendants to admit their crimes and receive more favorable 
terms at sentencing means that a plea agreement can benefit both parties (Missouri v Frye, 2012). 
This rationale has been used to justify plea bargaining through the idea that defendants can get a 
reduced sentence by confessing to something that they have done (see, Garrett, 2016). However, 
academics and legal commentators have noted that characteristics of the current plea bargaining 
system mean that it is not just operating in a way that allows defendants to get a reduced 
sentence by confessing to something that they have done, but also to encourage or even coerce 
innocent defendants into pleading guilty (see, for example, Blume & Helm, 2014; Caldwell, 
2011; Dervan & Edkins, 2013; Helm & Reyna, 2017; Zottoli, Daftary-Kapur, Winters, & Hogan, 
2016).  
Some commentators have argued that it is not a problem that innocent defendant’s plead 
guilty because innocent defendants should be able to enjoy the benefits of pleading guilty, 
including reducing or altogether avoiding custody (Bowers, 2008). However, other research 
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suggests that prosecutors may be encouraging those who are unlikely to be convicted at trial to 
plead guilty by offering highly coercive plea offers (Bushway & Redlich, 2012; Zottoli et al., 
2016).  The force of these arguments should be evaluated based on knowledge of how plea 
bargaining operates in practice. More specifically, we need to understand when and why are 
innocent defendants pleading guilty. 
Research has investigated and evaluated the practice of plea bargaining, and the 
likelihood of innocent defendants pleading guilty, through experimental work (for example 
Dervan & Edkins, 2013; Grisso et al., 2003; Helm & Reyna, 2017; Tor, Gazal-Ayal, & Garcia, 
2010) or through interviews with defendants who have made plea decisions (Daftary-Kapur & 
Zottoli, 2014; Zottoli et al., 2016). However, little research has investigated the perspectives of 
attorneys on innocent defendants pleading guilty. This is an important perspective, since 
experimental research involves decision-makers with no experience of real pleas and real 
defendants may have an incentive to claim that they are innocent when this is not the case. 
Interviewing attorneys can therefore complement experimental work and interviews of real 
defendants. It can also provide important insight into the types of advice that attorneys give to 
clients choosing whether to plead guilty, and how attorney advice might be influencing innocent 
defendants deciding whether to plead guilty.  
In this paper, we interview criminal defense attorneys about their real experiences with 
the plea system, and the advice they would give in hypothetical cases. Building on previous 
research examining the practice of innocent defendants pleading guilty, and the influence of 
attorney advice on plea decisions (discussed below), we focus on three primary issues: how often 
attorneys believe innocent defendants plead guilty, if and when attorneys believe that innocent 
	   69	  
defendants should plead guilty given the current system, and the influence that attorney advice 
may have on this practice.  
The Practice of Innocent Defendants Pleading Guilty 
 Blume and Helm (2014) identified three reasons why innocent defendants might (and do) 
plead guilty – defendants charged with minor or relatively minor offenses might plead guilty to 
get out of jail, defendants who have prevailed during the appellate process might plead guilty in 
exchange for a sentence of time served, and defendants might plead guilty due to fear of a harsh 
punishment (Blume & Helm, 2014). Empirical research examining real legal decisions has 
confirmed that innocent defendants do plead guilty.  In 2017, about 18% of exonerations listed in 
the National Registry of Exonerations were categorized as involving a guilty plea (National 
Registry of Exonerations, 2017), and the true number of wrongful convictions from guilty pleas 
is likely higher since exoneration is particularly hard for defendants who have pled guilty (Blume 
& Helm, 2014). In one study, Dr. Russell Covey examined guilty plea rates among defendants in 
a case that produced a large number of exonerees (Covey, 2013). He classified participants in the 
case as innocent, maybe innocent, or guilty, and found that 77% of those classified as innocent 
pled guilty, compared to 88% of those classified as guilty, and 89% of those classified as maybe 
innocent (Covey, 2013). 
 More controlled experimental designs have also examined the extent to which innocent 
defendants might be pleading guilty. Rates of guilty pleas among innocent defendants and the 
populations and tasks involved in the studies are displayed in Table 1. Current research suggests 
that innocent defendants plead guilty between 12.9% and 77% of the time, depending on the 
particular decision being made and important details such as the probability of conviction at trial, 
and the potential penalties involved. For example, innocent (and guilty) defendants are more 
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likely to plead guilty when doing so can help them avoid jail time (Redlich & Shteynberg, 2016) 
or a felony conviction (Helm & Reyna, 2017), and when there is higher chance that they will be 
convicted at trial (Helm & Reyna, 2017).  
Table 1: Summary of studies involving examining when innocent defendants plead guilty. 
Study Type Study Task Population Innocents Pleading 
Guilty (%) 
Covey, 2013 Real  Pleas in the Rampart, CA case Adult 77 
Redlich & 
Shteynberg, 2016 
Experimental Plea in hypothetical involving 
robbery. Varied in terms of 
whether plea offer included jail. 
Chance of being found guilty at 
trial was high (75%) 
Juvenile 31.8 
Young Adult 12.9 
Dervan & Edkins, 
2013 
Experimental Plea when students who didn’t 
cheat were accused of cheating 
and offered a plea deal, or the 
chance to go before an academic 
review board.  
Young Adult 56.4 
Tor, Gazal-Ayal, & 
Garcia, 2010 
Experimental Plea when told to imagine 
charged with an academic 
violation when innocent – could 
plead (and fail the class) or have 
a 60% chance of suspension 
from university and a 40% 
chance of exoneration.  
Young Adult 20 
Helm & Reyna, 
2017 
Experimental Plea when told to imagine 
charged with theft or arson. 
Probability of conviction either 
30% or 70%. 
Adult 
(college-age 
and post-
college-age) 
Approx. 29 
Helm & Reyna, in 
preparation 
Experimental Plea when told to imagine 
charged with theft or arson. 
Probability of conviction either 
30% or 70%. 
Adolescent Approx. 31 
 
The Influence of Attorney Advice on Plea Decisions 
 As experts on the legal system tasked with advising clients, attorneys have an important 
role in the plea bargaining process (Alschuler, 1975, Hessick & Saujani, 2002). This is 
particularly true since the advice of attorneys has been shown to be be an important predictor of 
defendant plea decisions (Viljoen, Klaver, & Roesch, 2005). Importantly, some legal scholars 
have argued that attorneys actually have a bias towards plea bargaining in legal cases, whereby 
attorneys persuade their clients to enter into plea agreements (Alschuler, 1975; Blumberg, 1979). 
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If this is true, attorney advice could be leading innocent clients to plead guilty even where the 
chance of conviction at trial is not high.  The cases of Missouri v Frye and Lafler v Cooper 
establish that a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel extends 
into conduct during the plea bargaining process. This means that a defendant has a right to 
effective assistance from a defense attorney when deciding whether to accept or reject a plea 
bargain. In Frye, it was found that defense counsel was ineffective because of failing to convey a 
plea offer to a defendant. In Lafler, it was found that defense counsel was ineffective when 
incompetent advice caused the defendant to reject a guilty plea and proceed to trial. Justice 
Kennedy delivered the majority opinion which held that the proper test is whether, absent the 
ineffective counsel, a defendant would have accepted an offered plea that was less severe than 
his eventual sentence, and the trial court would have accepted the terms of that plea. This could 
make attorneys less likely to recommend going to trial even for innocent defendants, as trial 
usually carries a risk of a worse outcome than would be gained through a plea. This is could be 
true even when there is a very low chance of conviction at trial (in the case of many innocent 
defendants), as research suggests that prosecutors will offer particularly appealing offers in these 
cases (Bushway & Redlich, 2012; Champion, 1989).   
A small number of studies have examined attorney plea recommendations. One study, 
using an experimental design, showed that probability of conviction, potential sentences, and 
defendant preference all influenced attorney plea advice (Kramer, Wolbransky, & Heilbrun, 
2007). Another study has shown that attorneys can be influenced by the race of a client when 
giving plea advice – feeling that they could obtain better plea deals with a Caucasian client than 
with a minority client, even when controlling for perceptions of guilt (Edkins, 2011). However, 
relationship between guilt and innocence, attorney advice, and plea decisions has not previously 
	   72	  
been examined in the literature. Specifically, research has not investigated how attorneys 
perceive plea bargaining’s innocence problem, and how attorney advice might influence innocent 
defendants planning to plead guilty. Under what circumstances do attorneys think that innocent 
defendants should plead guilty? Could attorney advice be leading innocent defendants to plead 
guilty? Are attorneys influenced by their own perceptions of the guilt of a client, even when 
controlling for the perceived probability of conviction at trial? In this study, we seek to answer 
these questions through interviewing attorneys and asking attorneys to make decisions in 
hypothetical plea vignettes.  
Method 
Participants.  
Participants were 189 criminal defense attorneys, recruited via defense attorney listservs 
in New York, Tennessee, Wisconsin, Wyoming, Vermont, Idaho, Iowa, Arizona, and Rhode 
Island (note that some attorneys chose to leave some questions blank and so we did not have our 
full sample of 189 attorneys for all questions so the number of attorneys responding to each 
question is reported). Participants completed the study online and participation took around 10 
minutes. Participants were 57.6% male and received a small amount of monetary compensation 
for their participation. All participants provided consent to take part in the study, and the project 
was approved by the Cornell Institutional Review Board.  
The Survey Instrument. 
 Participants were first asked whether they had any experience advising clients on 
whether to accept plea bargains and could select an answer of yes, no, or prefer not to answer. 
They were then asked our series of questions assessing plea bargaining’s innocence problem.  
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 How often do innocent defendants plead guilty? Participants were asked whether they 
had ever been involved in a case where a client chose to plead guilty despite maintaining their 
innocence (and selected yes, no, or prefer not to answer), and whether they had ever advised a 
client who they believed was innocent to plead guilty (and selected yes, no, or prefer not to 
answer).  They were then asked roughly what proportion of defendants who plead guilty they 
think are completely innocent, or guilty of a lesser crime than the one they end up pleading guilty 
to. We asked participants for a written response, and told them that they could just write NA if 
they felt unable to give a figure.  
 When should innocent defendants plead guilty? Next, we asked participants whether 
there were cases in which they believed that innocent defendants should plead guilty and if so, 
what the characteristics of these cases were. 
 The influence of attorney advice. Participants were then asked questions probing 
attorney advice to clients. First, they were asked whether they have ever encouraged a client who 
wished to take a plea deal to go to trial. Second, they were asked whether they have ever 
encouraged a client who wished to go to trial to take a plea deal.  
Experimental Task Assessing Attorney Advice.  
Participants were also given two hypothetical plea vignettes and were asked to decide 
whether a client should go to trial or plead guilty in the vignettes. One (Case 1) involved a young 
girl who had been caught with marijuana, and the other (Case 2) involved an adult who was 
accused of sexual assault. In both cases, the defendant claims that they are innocent and must 
chose to plead guilty in exchange for a misdemeanor conviction or go to trial and risk getting 
convicted of a felony. We randomly assigned half of the participants to see additional facts in the 
hypotheticals which meant that pleading guilty (even to a misdemeanor) would have particularly 
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harmful consequences for the client - likely rejection of a citizenship application (in the 
marijuana case) or the loss of a career as a teacher (in the sexual assault case). Participants would 
either see both cases with these additional consequences, or neither case with these additional 
consequences. In each case, we asked participants to estimate the percentage likelihood of the 
defendant being guilty, and the percentage likelihood of the defendant being found guilty at trial. 
The order of these questions was counterbalanced. We then asked them what they would advise 
the defendant to do in the hypothetical, and asked them to give a short justification for their 
response We used these answers to examine the relationships between probability of conviction 
at trial, guilt and innocence, and plea advice, in a real task. Following completion of all tasks, 
attorneys completed some short demographics questions.  
 
Results 
 One hundred and sixty-six participants answered our questions about experiences with 
the plea-bargaining system. Of our 166 participants, 163 (98.19%) stated that they had 
experience advising clients on whether to accept plea bargains, one stated that they did not have 
experience advising clients on whether to accept plea bargains (0.60%), and two said that they 
preferred not to answer (1.20%).  
How Often Do Innocent Defendants Plead Guilty?   
When asked whether they had ever been involved in a case where a client chose to plead 
guilty despite maintaining their innocence, 148 (89.16%) of our participants said yes, 14 (8.43%) 
of our participants said no, and 4 (2.41%) of our participants said that they preferred not to 
answer. Seventy-four (44.58%) of our participants said that they had advised a client who they 
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believed was innocent to plead guilty, 78 (46.99%) said that they had not, and 14 (8.43%) 
preferred not to answer that question.  
Thirty attorneys provided an estimate of the proportion of defendants who plead guilty that they 
believe to be innocent, or guilty of a lesser offense than the one they pled guilty to. Estimates 
varied widely from less than 5% to 70% (M = 23.82, SD = 19.59), and the results are displayed 
in Figure 1.  
 
Figure 1: Attorney estimates of the proportion of people who plead guilty who are actually innocent, or guilty of a 
letter offense than they plead guilty to.  
 
Should Innocent Defendants Ever Plead Guilty?  
We asked attorneys whether they believed there were cases in which innocent defendants 
should plead guilty. One hundred and forty-two attorneys gave a yes or no response to this 
question. Of those attorneys, 104 (73.2%) said there were cases in which innocent defendants 
should plead guilty given the current system. Thirty-eight (26.8%) said that innocent defendants 
should not ever plead guilty. Attorneys who said that innocent defendants should plead guilty 
were asked to elaborate on the circumstances in which they thought this was the case. The 
majority of responses fitted into four general (and overlapping) themes – when possible 
outcomes at trial were very severe, where a cost-benefit analysis favored taking the plea (e.g. 
because of strong evidence against a defendant and a good plea offer), where pleading guilty 
would benefit the client through faster and easier resolution of the case (e.g. getting them out of 
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jail, or avoiding the pressure of trial), and avoiding significant repercussions through a plea.  
Table 2 shows a summary of the number of attorneys who identified each theme, and some 
sample responses for each theme. Note that some attorneys identified more than one theme. 
Table 2: Responses when asked whether there are cases in which innocent defendants should plead guilty. 
Theme Number of 
Attorneys 
Sample Responses 
Severe outcome 
at trial 
32 Many innocent people take deals when facing draconian mandatory penalties. 
Faced with decades of prison and offered a year or two, rational people don’t even 
gamble. 
 
Even if the risks of losing are extremely small, the consequences of losing can 
change a client’s life where the consequences of a plea will not. 
 
If the risks of conviction are great, even if the likelihood is low, it may make sense. 
 
The state has such incredible leverage and power in many cases, it can be in 
someone’s best interest to accept a plea to eliminate their risk of catastrophic 
consequences. 
 
Cost-benefit 
analysis / 
Chance of 
conviction and 
sentences 
involved 
58 Where it is unlikely they will be successful at trial AND the plea deal is for a 
substantially less crime or minor sentence 
 
When the evidence is overwhelming and the stakes are very high, like mandatory 
minimum sentences to be avoided. 
 
Yes – it is a pure costs benefit analysis especially where there are immigration or 
job related consequences that can be avoided by a plea. 
 
When the likelihood of conviction and a substantially worse outcome outweighs the 
likelihood of acquittal or a substantially better outcome. 
 
Faster and easier 
resolution 
9 I have been involved in cases where it would have taken my clients longer than the 
sentence stimulated in the plea offer to go through trial and litigate the case.  
 
Clients in pretrial custody with a preexisting criminal record can benefit from 
pleading guilty to a petty charge for the sole reason that they can get out of custody 
and resume their lives. 
 
Unfortunately, clients may have to plead guilty to save money due to incarceration 
while waiting for trial.  
 
When a person has been held in jail for several weeks without the means to bond out 
and the offense is relatively minor, clients often lose their motivation to fight. 
 
A plea offer than 
avoids any 
significant 
repercussions 
11 Yes, an innocent client might plead guilty if the consequences would not hamper 
future activity such as job qualifications, or movement.  
 
A plea that avoids significant repercussions and eliminates the risk of these things is 
usually worth it. 
 
An obvious case is where the conviction will be of no practical consequence. 
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Several attorneys gave examples of cases in which they had likely innocent clients who 
chose to plead guilty. For example – a case where a likely innocent client was charged with a 
felony where a loss of life was involved but could plead guilty to a misdemeanor and be released 
from jail, a case in which a likely innocent client was charged with sexual assaults (and 
threatened with a 40-year felony sentence) and could pled guilty to disorderly conduct and be 
sentenced to pay only court costs, and a case in which a likely innocent client was accused of 
murder and could plead guilty to being an accessory after the fact and be sentenced to time 
served (8 months in jail) and probation.  Many attorneys also noted that the ultimate decision as 
to whether to plead guilty (when innocent or otherwise) was with the client. Another recurring 
theme was mandatory sentences (laws in some states that require defendants convicted of certain 
crimes to serve predefined terms, see Subramanian, & Delaney, 2014). Mandatory sentences 
were mentioned by 15 attorneys as a reason that innocent defendants pled guilty, due to the harsh 
outcomes mandated upon conviction at trial, and discrepancies between these outcomes and plea 
offers.  
The Influence of Attorney Advice.  
When asked whether they had ever encouraged a client who wished to take a plea deal to 
go to trial, 118 of our attorneys gave a yes or no answer. Of these attorneys, 80 (67.80%) said 
that they had encouraged a client who wished to take a plea deal to go to trial, and 38 (39.20%) 
said that they had not. When asked whether they had ever encouraged a client who wanted to go 
to trial to accept a plea deal, 143 of our attorneys gave a yes or no answer. Of these attorneys, 
129 (90.21%) said that they had encouraged a client who wanted to go to trial to accept a plea 
deal, and 18 (12.59%) said that they had not. These results suggest that attorneys are advising 
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clients who want to go to trial to plead guilty more often than they are advising clients who want 
to plead guilty to go to trial.  
We then examined the reasons that attorneys gave for encouraging a client who wanted to 
go to accept a plea deal to go to trial (note that not all attorneys gave a reason and some attorneys 
gave more than one reason (Figure 2). Attorney responses fit broadly into six overlapping themes 
– because the client doesnt appreciate the long-term consequences of the plea, because the client 
is irrational due to being scared, because the client underestimates the chance of success at trial / 
there is a good chance of success at trial, because that the plea offer was bad and the client had 
little to lose by going to trial, and because the client was innocent. Attorneys who said that they 
had not encouraged a client who wanted to plead guilty to go to trial also gave reasons for this. 
These reasons fit broadly into three themes (which sometimes overlapped) –that trial is 
unpredictable, the jury could be biased, and they do not want to impose risk on a client, that it is 
the clients decision what to do, and that it is unethical to do so.  
 
Figure 2: Reasons given by attorneys for encouraging a client to go to trial rather than plead guilty, and for not 
encouraging a client to go to trial rather than plead guilty.  
 
 
Second, we examined the reasons why attorneys did or did not encourage a client who 
wanted to go to trial to accept a plea deal (see Figure 3). Attorney responses to why they have 
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encouraged a client to take a plea deal rather than go to trial fit broadly into five themes (which 
often overlapped) – because chances of success at trial are small, because of the serious potential 
consequences of trial, because of the unpredictability of trial, because the clients initial decision 
is based on an unrealistic view of a trial, and because of the costs of trial.  Note that not all 
attorneys gave a reason for their answer, and that some attorneys gave more than one reason. The 
two most popular reasons were that they have encouraged clients to take plea deals where the 
chances of success at trial are very low, or the consequences if convicted are severe.  
	    
Figure 3: Reasons given by attorneys for encouraging a client to plead guilty rather than go to trial, and for not 
encouraging a client to plead guilty rather than go to trial.  
 
 
We identified two primary reasons why attorneys would not encourage a client to accept 
a plea (although note that many attorneys in this category did not provide reasons) – that it is the 
clients decision what to do, and that it is unethical to do so. 
Experimental Task Assessing Attorney Advice 
Finally, we analyzed the results of our experimental task in which we gave attorneys case 
facts from two cases (Case 1 involving a school girl accused or marijuana possession, and Case 2 
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these questions. Overall, attorneys advised the defendant to plead guilty more in Case 1 
(Mcase1=.55, SD = .50, Mcase2= .37, SD = .49, p<.001 (Fishers Exact Test)).  Attorneys also 
thought that the defendant in Case 1 was more likely to be guilty (Mcase1=65.12, SD = 24.58, 
Mcase2= 47.00, SD = 20,56, t(170)=8.54,  p<.001), and that the defendant in Case 1 was more 
likely to be convicted at trial (Mcase1=77.34, SD=16.12, Mcase2 = 62.68, SD =20.77, t(170)=8.19, 
p<.001). Ninety-five attorneys were in our condition where a misdemeanor conviction would 
have its normal consequences in each case. Ninety-four attorneys were in our condition where a 
misdemeanor conviction would have an abnormally severe impact (by impacting immigration 
status in Case 1, or through causing the loss of a career as a teacher in Case 2).  
In both cases, we conducted a logistic regression using our misdemeanor impact 
condition, attorney estimates of the probability of conviction at trial, and attorney estimates of 
defendant guilt, to predict plea advice. We also controlled for gender which was not the same 
across our experimental manipulations (in our normal misdemeanor condition, 37% of 
participants were male, and in our severe misdemeanor condition, 48% of participants were 
male). The results for Case 1 (marijuana) and Case 2 are displayed in Table 3.  
Table 3: Logistic regression results using impact of misdemeanor, probability of conviction at trial estimate, 
probability of guilt estimate, and gender, to predict plea advice (0=Go to trial, 1=Plead guilty). 
 
 B SE  Wald OR 
Case 1 (Marijuana)     
         Misdemeanor Impact (0,1) -1.90 .393 23.30 6.65* 
         Prob. of conviction estimate .046 .013 11.68 .955* 
         Prob. of guilt estimate .016 .008 3.84 .985* 
         Gender (0,1) -.054 .387 .020 .947 
     
Case 2 (Sexual Assault)     
         Misdemeanor Impact (0,1) -.419 .430 .950 1.52 
         Prob. of conviction estimate .081 .015 31.01 .922* 
         Prob. of guilt estimate .025 .013 3.84 .975* 
         Gender (0,1) .250 .422 .334 .779 
*p≤.05 
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Finally, we looked specifically at attorneys who had stated that there was a less than 50% 
chance that the defendant was guilty in each case, to specifically examine the decisions of 
attorneys who believed the defendant was probably innocent. 
In Case 1, 29 attorneys thought that there was a less than 50% chance that the defendant 
was guilty. Of these attorneys, 45% recommended that the defendant plead guilty. A logistic 
regression showed that in this group attorneys in the condition with a severe impact of a 
misdemeanor were less likely to recommend pleas (B=-2.873, SE = 1.085, Wald = 7.012, OR 
=17.70, p=.008), but there was no significant influence of likelihood of conviction at trial, or 
gender. We examined the reasons why these attorneys, who thought there was a less than 50% 
chance that the client was guilty, would recommend a guilty plea. Responses referred to the fact 
that she would be unlikely to win at trial (e.g. She seems unlikely to win at trial) and the more 
serious consequences of a felony conviction (e.g. The plea would mean that she would not lose 
her civil rights, would not have a felony conviction on her record…I would want to protect her in 
case of future police contact. The risks of a felony conviction along with a lifetime of 
consequences associated with that conviction are too great to accept in this scenario when 
compared with the far less significant consequences of explaining a misdemeanor charge).  
In Case 2, 65 attorneys thought that there was a less than 50% chance that the defendant 
was guilty. Of these attorneys, 22% recommended that the defendant plead guilty. A logistic 
regression showed that in this group attorneys who thought there was a higher chance of 
conviction at trial were more likely to recommend pleading guilty (B=.091, SE = .026, Wald = 
11.92, OR =.913, p=.001), but there was no significant influence of our misdemeanor 
manipulation, or gender. We examined the reasons why these attorneys, who thought there was a 
less than 50% chance that the client was guilty, would recommend a guilty plea. Responses 
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referred to the fact that the risk of trial would be high (e.g. The risk is too high for a trial, but I 
would not push the client to make this decision), that juries in child sexual abuse cases often 
believe the child (e.g. It will be his word against the client and juries are liable to believe the 
child), and that the likely penalty if convicted would be very serious (e.g. He would face decades 
in prisons and many other severe repercussions from a felony conviction of this nature. No one 
could risk the mandatory felony penalties on sex crimes when offered a misdemeanor).  
 
Discussion 
This study provides what is, to our knowledge, the first empirical study of attorney perspectives 
on plea bargaining and attorney plea recommendations. Although our data is only from a 
relatively small sample of attorneys, it confirms concerns that have been raised in the legal 
literature and the psycho-legal literature regarding the extent to which innocent defendants are 
pleading guilty and procedures in the current plea system that seem to encourage this practice 
(see Blume & Helm, 2014; Dervan, 2012; Dervan & Edkins, 2013; Covey, 2013; Hessick & 
Saujani, 2002).  Results provide important insight into the extent of this practice, the extent to 
which some innocent defendants should plead guilty in the current system, and how attorney 
advice might influence this practice.  
How Often Do Innocent Defendants Plead Guilty?  
Scholars supporting plea bargaining have argued that innocent defendants would be 
unlikely to find plea offers attractive, going as far as to describe the problem of innocent 
defendants pleading guilty as “barely a perceptible theoretical ripple” when compared with other 
costs in the plea bargaining system (Easterbrook, 1992; Schulhofer, 1992). However, 
accumulating research suggests that innocent defendants might be pleading guilty fairly 
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frequently (for example Dervan & Edkins, 2013; Grisso et al., 2003; Helm & Reyna, 2017; Tor, 
Gazal-Ayal, & Garcia, 2010). Our results support this accumulating research. They indicate that 
almost all of our attorneys have experience dealing with clients who claim to be innocent but 
plead guilty, and almost half of our attorneys have advised clients who they believe to be 
innocent to plead guilty. Importantly, when asked about the proportion of defendants who plead 
guilty but are really innocent or guilty only of a lesser charge, there was very little consensus 
among attorneys, with estimates ranging from less than five percent to over fifty percent, and 
many choosing not to give a response at all. This is understandable since it is very difficult for an 
attorney to know whether a client is factually innocent or guilty. However, importantly, 27 of the 
30 attorneys who answered this question believed that of the defendants who plead guilty 5% or 
more are factually innocent or guilty of a lesser charge. If true, this would make plea bargaining 
a very important cause of wrongful conviction (although note that wrongful convictions resulting 
from plea are likely to be convictions for lesser sentences than those resulting from trial), and 
certainly more of a problem than a barely perceptible theoretical ripple.      
Should Innocent Defendants Ever Plead Guilty? 
Our results suggest that in the current system the majority of attorneys believe that there 
are cases in which innocent defendants should plead guilty. Scholars have argued that innocent 
defendants are able to, and should be able to, enjoy the benefits of pleading guilty (Bowers, 
2008; Easterbrook, 1992). According to these arguments, persons at risk of unjust conviction 
may prefer a certain (but low) punishment in a plea bargain to the risk of conviction and higher 
punishment after trial (Easterbrook, 1992), and this can lead to less punishment for defendants 
who are truly innocent (Bowers, 2008).   
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 These arguments are based on the idea that defendants will be able to rationally weigh 
the costs and benefits of a plea offer in a sensible way. Our results suggest that attorneys do 
recognize this type of costs-benefits analysis as one reason that innocent defendants should plead 
guilty. However, importantly, our research suggests that from the perspective of attorneys there 
are other reasons that innocent defendants should be pleading guilty. For example, sometimes 
defendants are threatened with such harsh punishments at trial (something that is exacerbated by 
mandatory minimum sentences) and offered very lenient plea deals – for example a sentence of 
time served (8 months) and a misdemeanor conviction when threatened with a murder conviction 
if convicted at trial. This kind of discrepancy is likely to lead to innocent defendants pleading 
guilty even when there is only a very small probability of conviction at trial, and the gravity of 
the threatened punishment does not truly give defendants a fair choice in this situation.   This 
problem can be exacerbated by the practice of vertical “overcharging,” whereby prosecutors 
include different substantive offences in an initial charge with the intent to dismiss one or more 
of them (Ross, 1978).  
The Influence of Attorney Advice 
 Our research suggests that attorneys are more likely to encourage a client who wants to 
go to trial to enter a plea bargain than to encourage a client who wants to plea bargain to go to 
trial. Responses suggest that this is due to a reluctance to be partly responsible for imposing a 
large risk on a client, especially when consequences conviction at trial could be severe (even if 
chances of this outcome are low). This is logical, especially in light of Lafler v Cooper, since a 
client who goes to trial and gets convicted will know they could have got a better outcome by 
pleading guilty, and may blame the attorney for encouraging them to take a risk.  Attorneys who 
had not ever encouraged a client who wanted to take a plea bargain also often said that they did 
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not do so because the decision was up to the client, although note that this consideration was 
important to far fewer attorneys when asked whether they had ever encouraged a client who 
wanted to go to trial to accept a plea bargain (8 attorneys, compared to 26). The results of our 
experimental task confirm that even in cases in which attorneys think a client is innocent, they 
may encourage them to plead guilty (45% of attorneys in our first case and 22% of attorneys in 
our second case who were less than 50% sure the defendant was guilty said they would advise 
them to plead guilty). Responses suggest that although some attorneys based this advice on a 
high chance of conviction at trial, attorneys were also influenced by a reluctance to expose 
clients to the risks of a severe outcome if convicted at trial.  
 The fact that attorneys appear to be advising clients who want to plead guilty to go to trial 
less than they are advising clients who want to go to trial to plead guilty could mean attorneys 
may be contributing to additional innocent defendants pleading guilty to crimes they did not 
commit (which as noted above is not necessarily a bad thing given the current system). However, 
the results of our experimental task show that attorneys are influenced by the extent to which 
they think that a client is guilty or innocent, even when controlling for the probability of 
conviction at trial. This confirms that attorneys are more reluctant to encourage defendants who 
they believe are innocent to plead guilty.  
Limitations and Future Directions 
 The findings of our study should be interpreted in light of some important limitations. 
First, several attorneys completing our hypothetical plea scenarios noted that not enough 
information had been provided for them to truly assess the cases. In addition, we did not include 
preferences of defendants in our vignettes, and the vignettes were hypothetical and differed in 
important respects from real legal cases. Another limitation of this work is that it relied on self-
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report responses by a sub-set of attorneys. Our findings are therefore influenced by which 
attorneys chose to participate in the study, and what they chose to report to us. Our findings 
should also be considered alongside reports of defendants about their interactions with attorneys 
which suggest that in some cases the interaction of clients and attorneys may be limited (Zottoli 
et al., 2016).  Results should be interpreted with these limitations in mind, and future research 
should investigate the findings of this study further when considering real legal cases in which 
attorneys have advised clients.  
Implications for the Criminal Justice System 
 A theme that has come out of this study is that in the current system there are cases in 
which, from a practical perspective, innocent defendants should plead guilty, even when the 
chances they will be convicted at trial are not high. Importantly, a leading reason for this is that 
there is such a discrepancy between a plea offer and the outcome if convicted at trial that 
exercising the right to a trial becomes too risky even when the chances of conviction are low. 
The severe risks that can result from going to trial also appear to be making attorneys reluctant to 
advise clients to go to trial, since attorneys do not want to be responsible for imposing the risk of 
a severe conviction on a client when they could have received a much more lenient sentence in 
exchange for pleading guilty. This undercuts justifications that have been made for innocent 
defendants pleading guilty, since it takes away the consent of the defendant and the ability of the 
attorney to prevent the conviction of innocent defendants. When confronted with the chance of a 
possible murder conviction vs. a misdemeanor, defendants and attorneys often do not truly have 
a choice even where the chances of conviction are low. However, our results did indicate that 
attorneys are influenced by the suspected guilt or innocence of a client and the probability that 
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the client will be convicted at trial. This suggests that they are able to negotiate justice based on 
appropriate factors, although in some cases their hands may be tied by the current system.  
 Solutions to this problem might be for trial judges to more carefully monitor the 
discrepancy between original charges and a charge pleaded to, in order to ensure that prosecutors 
are not offering deals that are effectively coercive. Another option would be to eliminate charge 
bargaining and only allow sentence bargaining. This would mean that prosecutors could offer a 
reduced sentence but not a reduced charge in exchange for pleading guilty (Alschuler, 1976). 
This would allow defendants pleading guilty to enjoy some benefit, without being so persuasive 
so as to coerce innocent defendants into pleading guilty. This would also reduce the reported 
impact of mandatory minimum sentences. If it is really the case that someone who has 
committed a certain crime should get a certain sentence, this should be the case for all people 
who have committed that crime, not just for those who chose to exercise their right to a jury trial.  
Reducing the discrepancy between outcomes if convicted at trial and outcomes when pleading 
guilty would allow attorneys to appropriately advise their clients absent the fear of their client 
receiving a disproportionately high punishment, thus improving their ability to effectively 
negotiate justice and protect innocent defendants. 
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THESIS DISCUSSION 
 
 
In these papers, I have presented studies to illustrate that innocent defendants are likely to 
be systematically pleading guilty for reasons other than based on values and free choice given 
specific risks and benefits. Despite the fact that the vast majority of cases in the criminal justice 
system are currently resolved via plea rather than via trial, the infrastructure of the criminal 
justice system and procedural rules to protect defendants are largely still built around the idea of 
convictions via jury trial. Based on the research presented in this thesis and accumulating other 
research examining innocent defendants are pleading guilty, regulation should be introduced to 
protect innocent defendants in the criminal justice system.    
 One important change is that adolescent defendants should not be able to enter into plea 
agreements. Evidence from multiple studies now shows that adolescents are more likely than 
adults to plead guilty to crimes they did not commit, and my research suggests that this is due to 
a temporary stage in their cognitive development whereby a hyper-rational reasoning process 
makes them susceptible to superficially appealing offers, and prevents them from retrieving 
important values when making decisions. This developmental stage is highly likely to be 
temporary, and thus it is not appropriate for adolescents to be making decisions that could 
negatively influence the rest of their lives, especially under such potentially coercive 
circumstances.  
 In addition, transparency should be increased during plea negotiations so that defense 
counsel and the defendant are in a position to evaluate the prosecution case accurately. As far as 
possible, threats and estimates of conviction should not be made prematurely, to avoid risks of 
biases from anchoring. Finally, ideally plea bargaining would be restricted to sentence 
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bargaining rather than charge bargaining. This would restrict the prosecutions ability to threaten 
the defendant with severe felony sentences in order to encourage a plea for a more lenient 
misdemeanor sentence. This severe sentence could act as an anchor making the lenient sentence 
look more appealing. Interviews with attorneys also confirm the influence of severe sentences in 
coercing innocent defendants into pleading guilty, with little to no real choice. These severe 
sentences are also restricting attorney’s ability to bargain, since they are understandably reluctant 
to impose risks of very severe sentences on a client.  
 Ultimately, in a system whose infrastructure requires the vast majority of cases to be 
dealt with via plea bargain rather than trial it is inevitable that some defendants who are innocent 
will chose to plead guilty when carefully weighing up risk and reward. However, these changes 
would help to ensure that innocent defendants only plead guilty as a result of an informed choice, 
and not due to fear of harsh sentencing, susceptibility to cognitive bias, and developmental 
immaturity.  Thus, while not eliminating plea bargaining’s innocence problem, these reforms 
could help us to move closer towards the ideal of defendants being innocent until proven guilty, 
rather than innocent until persuaded to plead guilty.  
 
 
 
 
